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CONDEMNING A RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE LOAN: IS IT AN
EXTRATERRITORIAL TAKING?
MICHAEL M. SANDEZ*
Government attempts to solve every problem under the sun are
countless. The City of Richmond ("the City"), California's plan to
condemn loans held by trustees of residential mortgage-backed
securities trusts is one such attempt. The plan would seek to reduce the
risk of blight of the kind created by the 2008 financial crisis when
housing values decreased and resulted in underwater mortgages that
the City believes will increase the incidents of default, foreclosure, and
then blight. Richmond has adopted a resolution that declares its
legislative intent to pursue a plan with third parties providing counsel
and capital for the city. The plan involves condemning a limited
number of mortgages, paying a price that is greatly discounted due to
what is claimed to be a greater risk ofdefault, restructuring the loans to
reduce the principal and improve the terms, and reselling the loans in
the secondary mortgage market to other lenders. Unprecedented and
without statutory authority, the plan has caught the attention of the
legal community. Legal commentary has mainly focused on the
constitutional issues raised by the plan. Legitimate questions about
public use, just compensation, the impairment of obligation of contract,
and interference with interstate commerce are analyzed in the
commentary. This Article discusses whether the plan is an extra-
territorial taking. Calfornia law imposes the stringent requirements of
"legal necessity" on a condemnor that targets property located outside
its territorial jurisdiction. Since the loans are held by trusts located
outside Richmond city limits, this Article concludes that the situs of the
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mortgage loans is the domicile of the creditor, as has been held in cases
concerning the analogous governmental power to tax creditors. The
creditor's domicile rule provides a check against and accountability for
government's excessive use of eminent domain powers. Further, this
rule provides a measure of protection for owners of property located
outside city limits who are not represented by and cannot vote in
elections for the local government.
Introduction ....................................................239
A. Background..................................240
B. The City of Richmond ..................... ...... 244
C. Local Government's Power to Condemn Personal Property
is Limited. .................................... 245
I.Description of the City of Richmond's Plan to Condemn Mortgage
Notes ......................................... 246
A. The Plan as Described in the Trustees' Recent Lawsuit..........247
B. State of the City. ................................ 248
C. Federal Constitutional Issues Raised by the Richmond Plan ..249
1. Public Use ........................... ...... 249
2. Just Compensation ...................... ..... 251
3. Impairment of Obligation of Contract ........ ...... 252
D. Status of the Trustees' Lawsuit Against the City of
Richmond and MRP ......................................253
IL.Current Law Regarding the Condemnation of Mortgages by
Eminent Domain ............................. ..... 253
A. Condemnation of Intangible Personal Property..... ..... 254
B. Condemnation of Mortgages .................. ..... 254
1. Municipal Ownership of Dedicated Land....... ....... 255
2. Bankruptcy Court Reduction of Mortgage Principal
Balance .......... . ................. ..... 256
III.Extra-Territorial Condemnation of Mortgage Notes ....... ..... 261
A. The California Constitution and the Power of Eminent
Domain ............ . .................. .... 262
B. California Statutes and the Power of Eminent Domain...........263
C. California Case Law and the Condemnation of Extra-
Territorial Property ........................ ..... 264
1. Court Jurisdiction Over an Eminent Domain
Proceeding ................................. 264
2. California's Statutory Scheme for the Condemnation of
Extra-Territorial Property ................. ..... 265
a. The Standard to Establish an Implied Power to
Condemn . ............................... 267
(i) Resolution of Necessity and Presumptions..................275
238 Vol. 4:2
CONDEMNING A RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOAN
(ii) Necessity and Considerations of Economy.................276
(iii) Necessity and Blight.............. ........ 276
b. Policies Protective of Representative Government.......278
c. Extension of Implied Authority to Condemn Extra-
Territorial Property that is Incidental to a Statutory
Mandate................................280
IV.Challenges for the City of Richmond ................ ....... 281
A. The Threshold Question ................... ....... 282
B. The Standard of Legal Necessity ..................... 282
C. Resolution of Necessity and Presumptions... .............. 282
D. Policy ............................................ 283
E. Implied Power Incidental to Statutory Purpose .... ...... 284
Conclusion ........................................... 285
INTRODUCTION
Two cities in California and one city in Nevada have considered
exercising the power of eminent domain to condemn residential mortgage
loans but not the real property that serves as security for the loans. Two
cities have rejected the idea,' but the City of Richmond ("the City"),
California in 2013 passed a resolution with guidelines for the
condemnation of approximately 620 residential mortgages.2 Due to the
unprecedented taking of mortgages after the financial crisis of 2008, these
cities have caught the attention of the legal community. Most articles on
this topic address several constitutional issues, with public use and just
compensation being the two primary issues covered due to the
requirements of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. This Article, however, primarily focuses on the fact that the
residential loan promissory notes are most likely located outside
Richmond's city limits, raising the issue of the taking of extra-territorial
property: does a local municipality have the authority to take intangible
property such as residential mortgage loans that are located outside its
jurisdictional boundary? The context for the taking of mortgages is broader
than the 2008 financial crisis. It is fitting, therefore, to briefly consider
1. Jim Christie, Nevada City Rejects Eminent Domain Plan For Mortgages,
REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2013, 1:28 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/us-
northlasvegas-eminentdomain-idUSBRE98406B20130905; Alejandro Lazo, San
Bernardino County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/24/business/la-fi-mo-eminent-domain-
20130124.
2. Res. No. 120-13, Richmond City Council (Cal. 2013), available at
http://www.alicelaw.org/uploads/asset/asset-file/1955/2013_RichmondResolution_12
0.pdf.
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aspects of U.S. history and eminent domain law.
A. Background
Habitual deficit spending has led government officials of all levels
within the United States to use every tactic available to acquire more
revenue.3  Civil magistrates threaten and then take private property
virtually whenever and wherever they want, seemingly without
consequence to their politichl life. Stand up to them, and watch your world
turn upside down, which is often the case even if you win the battle, and
certainly is the case if you lose. The courts have nearly neutered the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by an
inordinately high degree of judicial deference and a low degree of judicial
scrutiny. Consequently, there is now minimal protection for property
owners, notwithstanding the accepted understanding at the formation of the
nation that government's central function is to protect its citizens' lives and
property, and to do so in the context of a limited and decentralized federal
system.4 We have come to a far different time than when the emphasis-
rhetorically and substantively-was placed on "life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness."'
The national government of the United States was formed with
enumerated powers. The Constitution, in Article I, section 8, delineates the
power that the People granted to the newly formed government. The
Founders, however, did not explicitly grant a federal power of eminent
domain, it being understood as a self-evident matter that a government of
enumerated powers needs property to establish itself and to carry out its
functions.6 The Takings Clause alludes to a power that enables the
3. Maxim Lott, Report: State Budgets Fudge Numbers to Hide Massive Debt,
FoxNEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/11/13/report-state-
budgets-fudge-numbers-projected-debt-worse-than-reported/ (reporting that State
Budget Solutions, a think tank that analyzed "unfunded liabilities", issued a report that
found that states under-report their debt, Illinois being the worst and California being
another example in that California discloses an unfunded liability of $4,909 per person,
but its actual debt is nearly $20,000 per person).
4. For the point about a limited national government, see e.g., Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 492, 573-74 (1870).
5. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (1776).
6. See, William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122
YALE L.J. 1738 (2013).
At the Founding, the federal government was not understood to have the power
to exercise eminent domain inside a state's borders. This understanding was
reflected in seventy-five years of subsequent practice and precedent. The
federal government sometimes needed land-for roads, lighthouses, etc.-but
it did not use eminent domain to get it. Instead, it repeatedly relied on the
states to condemn the land it needed. During this period, federal practice,
congressional debates, and even two Supreme Court opinions all indicated a
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acquisition of property when, as a protective measure, the Clause requires
the national government to take private property only for a public use and
only when it pays just compensation to the owner.7
The People, as the sovereign, must have reasoned that the power of
eminent domain can be implicitly extended, since the national government
was to be ratified as a limited government with certain identified powers
and with the obligation to exercise its express and implicit powers in
accordance with the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God."8 The
Founders understood the laws of nature and of nature's God to be
transcendent principles that, among other'things, were to guide government
officials and hold them accountable to ensure that the exercise of implicit
powers was not inconsistent with the express powers granted in the
compact that initially formed the government. 9  Since the compact
lack of any general federal power of eminent domain.
The original view was that the federal government had eminent domain power
only in the District of Columbia and the territories, where the Constitution
expressly granted it plenary power. Eminent domain could not be inferred from
Congress's enumerated powers or the Necessary and Proper Clause because it
was a great power, too important to be left to implication. As mentioned above,
this understanding was reflected in uniform, widespread practice. While there
certainly were expressions of the contrary view, especially several decades
after the Founding, those views were not actually reflected in any judicial
holding or federal practice until the Civil War. Meanwhile, during this period
the Supreme Court declared-in a surprisingly neglected decision-that
outside of the District and the territories "the United States have no
constitutional capacity to exercise ... eminent domain.
Id. at 1741-42 (citations omitted).
Mr. Baude points out that the view of federal eminent domain changed in 1875 when
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875). Id. at
1742-43; see also, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (1776); see, Baude, supra note
6, at 1800-01 (making the distinction between implicit powers, which follow from
enumerated powers, and inherent powers, which "requires no constitutional
recognition", citing Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875), in the author's
discussion of the dramatic shift in U.S. Supreme Court eminent domain jurisprudence).
9. The Declaration of Independence referenced a litany of the English monarch's
abuses, which were considered by the Founders as tyrannical and, being such, violated
God's higher law and thus were not law at all. See THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 3, et seq. (U.S. 1776) (referencing a litany of the English
monarch's abuses, which were considered tyrannical by the Founders and in violation
of God's higher law). See generally Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the
Foundation of Law, 4 LIBERTY U.L. REv. 297, 314 (2010) (stating that ". . . if a
provision of a constitution conflicts with the law of nature, it is not law, and the courts
are not to apply it because it is not law.").
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expressly limits the jurisdiction and authority of the federal government
through the delineation of enumerated powers, it follows that its unwritten
implicit powers must be limited, as well. It would be illogical to
methodically and deliberately form a limited government with the
expectation that undeclared implicit powers are unlimited or ever
expanding. There is an inextricable relationship between these implicit
powers and the government as it was formed. The sovereign formed its
government to achieve intended purposes and presupposed that such
intended purposes would be advanced and reinforced by certain
unexpressed implied powers. The power to condemn property is implied
because government's very existence as the seat of representative authority
must be housed; officials need places to carry out their duties to fulfill
government's primary purpose of seeking justice for the protection of lives
and property.o Beyond this, eminent domain can become a form of
tyranny.
Unfortunately, this incredible system, so very different in many respects
from what had been attempted in the Old World, has been taken over by
elites who believe government knows best. Jurisprudential views that
developed over the past century have accepted an ever-expanding view of
governmental power." As a result, governance, politics, and law have
become a suffocating paternalism.1 2 A paternalistic approach to nearly all
problems by all levels of government is so widespread that now, nearly
every turn of the economy justifies some type of official action, including
the condemnation of real and personal property. The decision in Kelo v.
City of New London, a leading U.S. Supreme Court eminent domain case,
further entrenches governmental paternalism by a test so broad that it
appears that local government will now use the common market cycle as
the basis for more central planning.' 3 This is not to say that the City of
10. See, Baude, supra note 6, at 1793-94; see also Miss. & Rum River Boom Co.
v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1879); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883)
(citing Patterson, 98 U.S. at 406).
11. See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchinson, Lochner, Liberty of Contract, And
Paternalism: Revising The Revisionists? Review Essay: David N. Mayer, Liberty of
Contract: Rediscovering A Lost Constitutional Right, 47 IND. L. REv. 421, 440, 443-44,
464-65 (2014) for a discussion of sociological jurisprudence and legal positivism as
developed in U.S. Supreme Court cases and analyzed in legal commentary.
12. Id. at 463.
13. Compare Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (declaring that the
city was "entitled" to the court's deference because the city had made the
". . determination that the area at issue was sufficiently distressed to justify a program
of economic rejuvenation[."), with Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)
("When this seemingly absolute protection [of private property in the Fifth
Amendment] is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of
human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private
property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the
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New London was solely under the pressures of a common economic
downturn. Apparently, the city was in a bad financial status as a result of
decisions that had been made over many years, and certainly was subject to
the standard effects of the common economic cycle. The point here is that
the Kelo ruling declared that public use encompasses economic
development and thus provides the basis for a governmental taking of
private property, which most likely will be interpreted to justify
condemnation in municipalities with far fewer economic problems than
those within New London. The problem is that local magistrates are now
the arbiters of what is a "sufficiently distressed" area. Exposed to abuse,
however, is the private property owner, who owns fee title subject to the
whims of local officials' notions of how to reverse economic distress and to
the risks of an economic bust that results from the speculative nature of the
local officials' economic development plan and reliance on private actors
that are free to withdraw from the project.
Unfortunately, economic development, supported with plans drawn up
by handy experts at the behest of municipal officials, generally will be
upheld by the courts1 4 where the local government has carefully considered
"a comprehensive development plan" and has "complied with elaborate
procedural requirements that facilitate review of the record and inquiry into
the city's purposes."15 Given the Court's broad expansion of public use to
include economic development, it probably does not matter that the New
London plan was a bust;1 6 however, it should. One can expect that future
economic development plans will pass constitutional muster under the
current jurisprudence that extends a great deal of deference so long as it
appears to be comprehensive, written in a manner that seeks to solve the
effects of rough economic waters, and carefully considered in an adequate
procedural context, regardless of the speculative nature of the plan.' 7 The
Constitution of the United States. The general rule at least is that while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.") (emphasis added).
14. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484. The Kelo majority also recognized that "[p]romoting
economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of government[.]"
Id. (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) and other cases).
15. Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16. Jeff Jacoby, Eminent Disaster, Homeowners in Connecticut Town were
Dispossessed for Nothing, Bos. GLOBE (Mar. 12, 2014, 7:12 PM),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/03/12/the-devastation-caused-eminent-
domain-abuse/yWsyOMNEZ91TM94PYQIhOL/story.html.
17. For a fairly thorough criticism of the Kelo decision that includes discussion of
economics, see generally Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic
Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 183 (2007). Economics is
not an exact science in large part because assumptions are made on human subjective
decisions and valuation, which will necessarily infuse speculation in any municipality's
economic development plan. See George Steven Swan, The Law And Economics Of
20 15 243
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lack of a guaranteed commitment by private entities central to the entire
enterprise is of no apparent concern. 18
B. The City ofRichmond
An example of such extensive paternalism is found in the City of
Richmond, California, where the city council passed a resolution that sets
out its legislative intent and guidelines for the condemnation of
approximately 624 mostly performing residential mortgages, so that the
city can rewrite and resell the loans to new lenders while those borrowers
remain in their homes and receive the windfall of better loan terms with a
lower principal.' 9 As some City councilmembers acknowledged economic
improvement in the City, the Richmond city council majority passed the
resolution on the basis that home values are underwater, which the majority
believed creates the probability that borrowers will default and vacate their
homes, lenders will foreclose, and blight will ensue.2 0 Undaunted by the
prospect of significant legal hurdles, the City has not retreated from its
resolution. Serious questions regarding public use, just compensation, and
impairment of obligation of contract are briefly described in this Article,
while the question of the extra-territoriality of the condemnation is more
closely considered.
This Article considers the City's plan for mortgage condemnation as an
example of the government's excessive use of its power to condemn
property. The City must have a fair degree of certainty that the
implementation of its regulation would be upheld, as it surveys the
predominant jurisprudential landscape that removed property rights from
the highly-protected category of fundamental rights and extended a degree
Fiduciary Duty: Womack v. Orchids Paper Products Co. 401(K) Savings Plan, 37
OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 17, 34-9, 44, 48-49 (2012) (lengthy discussion about the
lessons that economists learned and have yet to learn about their discipline after the
financial crisis of 2008). Professor Swan commented, "The economist's knowledge is
imperfect because no fully predetermined model adequately represents (by whatever
yardstick) the causal mechanism that underpins outcomes at every interval (past,
present, and future)." Swan, at 43.
18. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469, 504 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Somin,
supra note 17, at 228.
19. See Res. No. 120-13, Richmond City Council (Cal. 2013), available at
http://www.alicelaw.org/uploads/asset/assetfile/1955/2013_RichmondResolution_12
0.pdf.; see also Joel M. Langdon, The Importance of a Promise: Underwater
Mortgages and a Municipal Rescue Attempt Through Eminent Domain, 45 URB. LAW.
571, 604-06 (2013) (explaining how mortgagees can remain in their homes if they
qualify under certain mortgage reduction programs such as the Home Affordable
Modification Program Principal Reduction Alternative).
20. See Res. No. 120-13, Richmond City Council ¶¶ 3-4 (Cal. 2013), available at
http://www.alicelaw.org/uploads/asset/assetfile/1955/2013_RichmondResolution_12
0.pdf.
244 Vol. 4:2
CONDEMNING A RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOAN
of judicial deference that presumes the validity of regulations
notwithstanding their crippling effects upon private property rights and the
gross expansion of government. While case law generally supports
21
governmental condemnation of personal property, there is no case that
directly rules on the condemnation of a residential mortgage.22 Before a
court rules on this precise question, it is beneficial to review whether local
government has the authority to condemn mortgages so that it can
restructure and resell them. The literature on the topic typically covers-to
one degree or another-the issues raised by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the No Impairment of Contract Clause of Section 10 of
Article I of the U.S. Constitution.2 3 There is less attention given to the
extra-territorial nature of the City's condemnation of mortgages that are
likely to be located outside City limits. 24
C. Local Government's Power to Condemn Personal Property is Limited.
The federal Takings Clause was eventually made applicable to the states
and local governments by way of incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 5 At the national level, the condemnation of property is
considered an implicit power. In contrast, states are granted an express
power to condemn property through their constitutions and statutes.
21. Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain
Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt, vol. 19 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. AND FIN.,
at 6, nn. 12-14 (2013). Professor Hockett provides citations to several cases wherein
the condemnation of various types of personal property was in issue.
22. See, Leanne M. Welds, Note, Giving Local Municipalities the Power to Affect
the National Securities Market: Why the Use of Eminent Domain to Take Mortgages
Should be Subject to Greater Regulation, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 873-74 (2014).
Most cases have ruled on issues related to condemnation or dedication of real property
and the direct impact on the property interest lenders hold in and through its mortgage
or deed of trust; see, e.g., W. Fertilizer & Cortage Co. v. City of Alliance, 504 N.W.2d
808 (1993) (dispute between a city's interest in dedicated land and a lender's security
interest in the same land).
23. For the Takings Clause, see, e.g., Christine J. De Leon, Note, Eminent
Domain: Richmond, California's Illusory Solution to the Mortgage Crisis, 40 J. LEGIS.
191, 203-07 (2014); Andrew Peace, Comment, Coming Up for Air: The
Constitutionality of Using Eminent Domain to Condemn Under Water Mortgages, 54
B.C. L. REV. 2167, 2197-98 (2013). For the Impairment of Contract Clause, see, e.g.,
Clay A. Counts, Comment, The Unskinnable Cat: Debt Reduction, Eminent Domain
and the Contract Clause, 33 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 459, 477 (2014); Katharine
Roller, Note, The Constitutionality of Using Eminent Domain to Condemn Underwater
Mortgage Loans, 112 MICH. L. REv. 139, 156 (2013).
24. Michael S. Moskowitz, Comment, Treading Water: Can Municipal Efforts to
Condemn Underwater Mortgages Prevail?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 633, 655-56, 665 (2014)
(discussing briefly the location of a mortgage and extra-territorial jurisdiction of a
municipality to condemn intangible property such as a mortgage and concluding that
the City of Richmond would not prevail on this issue).
25. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-36 (1897).
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Likewise, local governments and agencies, as political subdivisions of, for
example, the state of California, must be granted the express power of
eminent domain by the state constitution or a statute before such a power
can be exercised.26  Cutting against the presumption of validity of
regulations, deference to local municipalities, and minimal protection for
economic liberties, are state constitutions and statutes that provide various
levels of restrictions to curb local government authority to condemn
property.27 One such restriction in California protects against a local
government's effort to condemn property located outside its territorial
jurisdiction.28 A municipality's extra-territorial jurisdiction for purposes of
condemnation is not necessarily coextensive with minimum contacts
relative to a court's in personam jurisdiction. 29 Relatedly, the lack of extra-
territorial jurisdiction to condemn may deprive a California trial court of
jurisdiction to try the eminent domain proceeding. Yet, the mortgages
that are the target of eminent domain do create a lien on real properties that
are located within the territorial limits of Richmond. Is this enough to give
the municipality the jurisdiction to condemn the promissory notes? The
City of Richmond will certainly need to take into account the extra-
territorial nature of its taking of mortgage notes in its condemnation plan as
it deliberates whether to proceed. Before an examination of the extra-
territoriality issue, a description of the Richmond plan to condemn
mortgage notes provides a helpful context.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND'S PLAN TO CONDEMN
MORTGAGE NOTES
Of the three municipalities that have considered the condemnation of
mortgage notes, Richmond remains the sole locale that still might move
beyond resolution to actual implementation. San Bernardino County,
California and Las Vegas, Nevada have abandoned further consideration.
Rather than a broad review of all three proposals, an analysis of the
particular aspects of Richmond's plan highlights the deficiencies of the
plan and the underlying policy. A recent lawsuit filed in federal court
26. San Francisco v. Ross, 279 P.2d 529, 531 (Cal. 1955)..
27. Many states enacted legislation that limits the power of eminent domain in a
backlash against the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Kelo. The backlash, however,
may have been inadequate to protect against government officials' constant (and
perhaps obsessive) use of the power of condemnation. See generally Illya Somin, The
Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REv. 2100
(2009).
28. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ( 1240.050 (West 2015).
29. Mayor of Balt. v. Balt. Football Club Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 284-85 (D. Md.
1986).
30. Harden v. Superior Court, 234 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1944).
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against the City provides a framework for the discussion that follows.
A. The Plan as Described in the Trustees' Recent Lawsuit
The City of Richmond was a defendant in a 2013 lawsuit3 ' for injunctive
and declaratory relief from its plan to condemn certain residential
mortgages that satisfy criteria established by the City and Mortgage Relief
Partners ("MRP"), a for-profit private investment company that consults
and actively participates with the City in this endeavor. The lawsuit was
filed after the Richmond City Council passed Resolution No. 120-13,
which set out in general terms its legislative intent and the guidelines it
would follow in its plan to condemn mortgage promissory notes. 32
In a court motion that contains a favorable description of the program,
the attorneys for the City and MRP stated that the City may "purchase
underwater mortgage loans for their fair market value, using eminent
domain powers if necessary, and then reduce the principal balances,
keeping the current homeowners in their homes for the benefit of
neighborhoods and the City as a whole."33 Initially, the City sent letters 34
to the holders of approximately 624 mortgages 35 in an effort to negotiate
the purchase of the mortgages, and the letters informed the lenders that the
City might resort to eminent domain if negotiations were fruitless.
The details of the plan indicate why the residential mortgage-backed
securities industry has been aggressive in opposing the plan, to the point
that a group of trustees36 filed the above-mentioned federal court complaint
31. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l
Ass'n v.Richmond, No. CV-13-3663-CRB at 35 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter
Complaint], available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/califomia/candce/3:2013cv03663/268907/1.
32. See Res. No. 120-13, Richmond City Council (Cal. 2013), available at
http://www.alicelaw.org/uploads/asset/assetfile/1955/2013_RichmondResolution_12
0.pdf.
33. Defendant Richmond's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
Thereof, at 1, Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. City of Richmond, No. CV-13-3663-
CRB (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Def.'s Motion to Dismiss], available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/califomia/candce/3:2013cv03663/268907/38.
34. Defendants' Opposition To Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 3, Wells
Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Richmond, No. CV-13-3663-CRB (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16,
2013) [hereinafter Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj.], available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/california/candce/3:2013cv03663/268907/32.
35. City of Richmond City Council Meeting Minutes, at 12 (Dec. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter Meeting Minutes], available at
http://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/5649.
36. The plaintiffs are trustees of hundreds of residential mortgage-backed
securitization trusts that hold the mortgages. Trust beneficiaries include public and
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against the City and MRP.37 In one court document, the trustees describe
the City's plan as follows:
Under the guise of providing "mortgage relief' to Richmond
homeowners, Richmond and [Mortgage Relief Partners ("MRP")] intend to
use Richmond's eminent domain power to seize mostly performing
mortgage loans hand-selected by MRP at steeply discounted prices
(typically 80% of the current value of the home, but in many cases much
less) and then allow MRP immediately to flip the loan to a new
government-backed securitization pool trust for a much higher price
(around 95% of the current value of the home). The substantial profit
resulting from this eminent domain arbitrage would be shared by MRP,
MRP's investors, and Richmond.
Though the plan may not be implemented precisely as described by the
trustees, their description reveals the issues that make the plan controversial
and possibly unconstitutional.39
B. State of the City
There is good reason to expect that the City will not go forward with the
condemnation plan, notwithstanding its successful defense of the federal
action. About one year has passed and the City has yet to pass a resolution
of necessity. California law requires such a resolution before an eminent
domain proceeding may commence.40 Contents of the resolution of
necessity must include, among other things: (i) a statement of the public
use for which the property is to be taken; (ii) the statute that authorizes the
condemnation of the property; (iii) a general description of the property and
its location; and (iv) a declaration that the public interest and necessity
require the proposed project, the proposed project will be compatible with
private pension plans, college savings plans, 401(k) savings plans, insurance
companies, mutual funds, university endowments, and government-sponsored
enterprises. Complaint, supra note 31, at 9.
37. Complaint, supra note 31.
38. Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, at i, Wells Fargo Bank,
Nat'l Ass'n v. City of Richmond, Cal., No. CV-13-3663-CRB (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16,
2013) [hereinafter Pls' Mot. for Prelim. Inj.], available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/california/candce/3:2013cv03663/268907/8; but see also Langdon, supra note
19, at 590 ("The Plan contemplates that the amount the municipality will pay will be
around 85% of the value of the real property that secures the mortgage.").
39. Various commentators have described and analyzed the plan. See, e.g.,
Langdon, supra note 19, at 601; De Leon, supra note 23, at 212-218.
40. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1245.220, 1240.040 (West 2015) ("A public entity
may not commence an eminent domain proceeding until its governing body has
adopted a resolution of necessity that meets the requirements of this article.").
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the greatest public good, and the property is necessary for the proposed
41
project. Current conditions in Richmond may not satisfy the criteria of a
resolution of necessity.
The City's efforts to condemn mortgages appear to have begun in 2013,
about five years after one of the worst years of the recent financial crisis.
In the State of the City Address in January 2014, the Mayor of Richmond
lauded the decline in crime and an increase in businesses and jobs in
2013.42 At a meeting of the City Council on December 13, 2013 (when
Resolution No. 120-13 was passed), an absent councilmember, who wanted
to put the plan to a vote of the citizens and who opposed the pending
resolution, had his letter read during the meeting. His letter noted that
"[m]ost of the current foreclosure loans are no longer owned by the
previous so-called Wall Street investors but by various labor unions, credit
unions, retirement pension funds and individuals" and that the "value of
homes throughout the nation as well as in Richmond are on a continuing
sharp increase."43 At the same meeting, a councilmember who was in
attendance wanted clarification since the plan "proponents state[d] that of
the 624 homes that received notices about one-third of those have had their
mortgages successfully renegotiated."4 4 If we assume those 624 homes
were selected by the City and MRP because they were in the
neighborhoods most impacted by the financial crisis, and that one-third of
the loans were indeed renegotiated, the necessity for the exercise of
eminent domain appears to be significantly minimized. If there has been a
reduction in crime and an increase in business and jobs, it appears the
project is unnecessary and does not advance the public good. Evidently,
time has made a difference in Richmond, which by these accounts appears
to be on its way to recovery.
C. Federal Constitutional Issues Raised by the Richmond Plan
Though the Richmond City Council has not proposed or voted on a
resolution of necessity, the Richmond-MRP plan raises fundamental
constitutional issues.
1. Public Use
An issue regarding the "public use" nature of the mortgage
condemnation plan arises from the fact that the City has selected only
41. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.230 (West 2015).
42. City of Richmond's State of the City, Richmond Demonstrates 21st Century
Leadership, (Jan. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/documentcenter/view/28194 (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
43. Meeting Minutes, supra note 35, at 10-11.
44. Id. at 11.
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certain mortgages to condemn, pursuant to its belief that the resultant
metrics will demonstrate economic improvement in the municipality.
When approximately 624 mortgages are being considered45 in a city with a
population of about 106,000 people,46 among whom there are presumably
thousands of mortgages, the accuracy of the claim that the plan is a "public
use" should be called into question.47 The plan targets mortgages that for
the most part, are performing loans,48 which makes it highly probable that
the borrowers occupy the houses and presumably maintain their homes in
satisfactory condition.49 Instead of a public use that benefits the
community, the plan is designed to benefit a small percentage of the
borrowing population, MRP, and the City itself, the latter two for the sake
of profit at the expense of the lenders.50 Blight seems to be a distant threat.
Another issue concerns the interpretation of "public use" that now
includes economic development. Democratic and Republican
administrations at the federal and state levels, as well as "non-partisan"
local municipalities, engage in habitual deficit spending for the sake of
subsidies or entitlement program creation and expansion, only to strain
government budgets on a daily basis.5 Consequently, a majority of elected
officials make revenue generation for government their highest priority,
perhaps second only to raising funds for reelection. Nearly every decision
turns on economics. With economic survival as a central focus of the day-
to-day affairs of local, state, and federal government, economic
45. See id.
46. See CITY-DATA.COM, Richmond, Calfornia, http://www.city-
data.com/city/Richmond-Califomia.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
47. A challenge to the claim of public use is particularly necessary because the
City selected only 624 loans but claimed there were many underwater mortgages,
which, in their minds, was the cause for the need to condemn mortgages. See Res. No.
120-13, Richmond City Council ¶ 2 (Cal. 2013), available at
http://www.alicelaw.org/uploads/asset/assetfile/I 955/2013_RichmondResolution_12
0.pdf ("In addition to this basic standard [of public use], we will specifically restrict the
use of eminent domain to the exceptional circumstances when large numbers of
households are underwater and there are not other adequate measures to address the
problem[.]" (emphasis added).
48. See Pls' Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra note 38, at i; see also Langdon, supra note
19, at 578.
49. If the homes are not satisfactorily maintained, Richmond code enforcement
officers can proceed with cease and desist letters and public nuisance enforcement
against the owners-borrowers. See Steve J. Eagle, Does Blight Really Justify
Condemnation?, 39 URB. LAW. 833, 836, 844-46 (2007) (arguing, among other points,
that the alternatives of abatement, foreclosure, and private revitalization are more
consistent with the Constitution and produce better outcomes).
50. Langdon, supra note 19, at 609-10; see also Alec Harris, Note, Redemption
and Return on Investment: Using Eminent Domain in the Underwater Mortgage Fight,
8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 437, 452-53, 464 (2014).
51. See Lott, supra note 3.
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development can easily be made the justification for condemnation of any
private property. As long as the procedural steps of thorough study and
preparation, a comprehensive written plan, and notice to the public with
public hearings are taken, no private owner's property is safe.52 Public
officials find broad legal authority under the Kelo decision, reinforcing
their belief that economic development efforts are for the public good, and
yet, ignoring the public's passionate reaction against Kelo and the implied
rejection of eminent domain in certain instances. Thus, lawsuits are
probably useless because it would be quite difficult to find a pretext for the
condemnation. Moreover, a political remedy is practically hopeless. 54
2. Just Compensation
The deeply discounted prices the City expects to pay for the mortgages
indicate there is a potential problem regarding just compensation. 5 What
is the fair market value of a mortgage that is secured by real property with a
value that is less than the loan principal balance? The City of Richmond
and MRP are of the opinion that deep discounts are justified given the
greater risk of borrower default when the collateral property's value is
underwater. In their view, borrowers will not continue to make mortgage
payments, and, despite investments of down payments and monthly
payments (perhaps for years), will walk away when personal financial
circumstances indicate that the borrowers will lose their homes by
foreclosure. The borrowers lose motivation to stay current and the risk of
default increases. Due to the higher risk of default and the cost of
foreclosure, there is a decrease in the value of the loan. The City and MRP
also claim that the trust beneficiaries are unable to recover the full loan
balance through the foreclosure sale, either because values have fallen, or
because foreclosure is a remedy that does not typically yield a sales price
that provides full recovery for lenders. A steep discount in a mortgage's
value is thus justified, according to the City and MRP.
The trustees and beneficiaries, on the other hand, contend that the
52. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503-05 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53. See James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half
Empty?, 17 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 128 n. 1, 151 n. 109 (2009) (citing legal commentary
and news article.that discuss public reaction to Kelo).
54. See Somin, supra note 17, at 218-221.
55. See Peace, supra note 23, at 2197-98 (explaining that rather than a traditional
approach toward just compensation that is determined by the fair market value of the
mortgage as agreed upon by a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm's length
transaction, the plan proponents claim the mortgages are underwater, subject to a
higher degree of default, that result in lower foreclosure prices, and should thus be
discounted, but that such claims include assumptions that may not occur, such as all
mortgages will end in foreclosure, and therefore just compensation may be higher than
what the City may want to pay).
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underwater value of the collateral has little if any impact on the
determination of the fair market value of the mortgage notes because home
values are on the rise and lenders can sell the foreclosed properties at a
later date when values are even higher. Lenders also contend that the
reason why foreclosure sale prices typically do not yield a full recovery of
the amount due is because of the lenders' voluntary choice to submit less
than full credit bids at the foreclosure sale such that this argument should
not be a factor.5 6  Notably, the City and MRP have targeted mostly
performing loans, which, of course, indicates that there is a lower risk that
the targeted borrowers will default. This fact alone greatly undermines
the City's purported justification for its plan. The City and MRP's position
is also weakened because they initially claim that the fair market value of
the loans requires a steep discount, yet they turn around to claim the fair
market value is higher in order for them to sell the loans (once restructured)
at a higher price to new lenders. In addition, there is a cost to lenders and
to residential mortgage-backed securitization trusts when performing
mortgages are condemned and thereby removed from the pool, which likely
creates an uneven level of risk among the loans that remain within the
portfolio. 59 On balance, it is likely that the actual fair market value will be
found to be closer to the principal balances on the loans rather than the
deep discounts the City and MRP claims. 60
3. Impairment of Obligation of Contract
Another potential issue is that a political subdivision of a state will
impair the obligation of a loan agreement arguably in contravention of the
Impairment of Obligation of Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 6 1
The City's and MRP's plan will use the mechanism of eminent domain for
the purpose of actually rewriting the terms of certain mortgages, which
provides a windfall to borrowers, a loss to trust beneficiaries, and a
handsome profit to the City and MRP, its investment partner. Neither the
56. There are many reasons, legal and factual, why a lender submits less than full
credit bids at a foreclosure sale, but this article does not delve in to this topic.
57. See Langdon, supra note 19, at 598.
58. The City and MRP will likely claim that the value would rise because the loan
terms were changed to make it easier for the borrowers to make their payments and
avoid default. There may be a difference in loan terms, but there does not appear to be
a difference in the risk of default because borrowers already make their payments under
current loan terms. Also, this ignores the indirect beneficial impact that the apparent
upward trend of home values and the economy in general in Richmond have on the
value of extant mortgages.
59. See Langdon, supra note 19, at 599.
60. See id. at 599-600
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Roller, supra note 23, at 156; Counts,
supra note 23, at 477.
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technical procedures nor the substance of eminent domain law should
overshadow the reality that the plan would impair the obligation of contract
between borrower and lender.6 2 According to the trustees, the plan may put
the trusts, the trustees, and/or the beneficiaries in jeopardy of violating
federal tax law.6 3 Query whether the trustees would be at risk for or have a
defense against claims of breach of the residential mortgage-backed
securitization trust pool agreements or breach of fiduciary duties owed to
the remaining pool beneficiaries because of the nonconsensual nature of the
condemnation of certain mortgage loans, the condemnor's subsequent
modification of the loan terms, and its resale of the newly restructured
loans with better terms.
D. Status of the Trustees' Lawsuit Against the City ofRichmond and MRP
The federal court in Wells Fargo v. Richmond did not decide these issues
because the trustees' complaint was dismissed for lack of ripeness, since
the City of Richmond had not passed a resolution of necessity to start the
condemnation proceeding, and the trust beneficiaries had not yet suffered a
loss. 64 Perhaps this and other related articles are solely academic exercises
unless and until the City actually commences condemnation proceedings
and the parties litigate the issues. Nonetheless, the fact that the City has
taken the first step with its resolution of intent and general guidelines for
the condemnation of mortgages should alert those who favor greater
protection of private property. As the City considers its next step, it is
worthwhile to review a local government's power to condemn personal
property located outside its territorial boundaries.
II. CURRENT LAW REGARDING THE CONDEMNATION OF MORTGAGES BY
EMINENT DOMAIN
An intriguing aspect of the condemnation of mortgages is that the
proposal raises many issues. In fact, the range of issues spans the treatment
of personal and real property rights by state and federal constitutions,
statutes, and cases in the context of government's eminent domain power.
In addition, the range of issues is framed by circumstances that have
significantly impacted the lending and housing markets, and the economy
in general. This Article cannot cover the entire span but does generally
62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See Counts, supra note 23, at 485; see also
Pis' Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra note 38, at 15-16.
63. Pis' Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra note 38, at 4.
64. Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, at 1-2, Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v.
Richmond, No. CV-13-3663-CRB (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/california/candce/3:2013cv03663/268907/78 (last visited April 20, 2015).
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address the law with regard to some issues and then specifically examines
the law regarding the extra-territorial nature of the City's condemnation
plan.
A. Condemnation ofIntangible Personal Property
The City was not the first to develop the plan to condemn by eminent
domain certain mortgages that were in private label securitized trusts as a
policy strategy for local governments to deal with the effects of the recent
financial crisis. MRP may have been the first, but based on the number of
articles published on this topic, it appears that much of the credit for this
idea goes to Professor Robert Hockett, a Professor of Law at Cornell Law
School.65 In one of his articles, Professor Hockett states:
Because the law draws no distinctions between kinds of property that can
be purchased in eminent domain, it is unsurprising that loans and liens in
particular, as one form of contractual obligation among many, are
themselves regularly purchased. Among these are mortgage loans and
liens, as the Supreme Court and state courts have long recognized. 66
Professor Hockett cites in his article cases that he contends support local
government's power to condemn mortgages.6 7 The cases involve rulings
that relate to the condemnation of various types of intangible property.6 8
B. Condemnation ofMortgages
The cases cited by Professor Hockett include one case concerning the
65. See Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain
Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt, 19 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. AND FIN., 1, 9
(2013). A list of his articles is listed under the References section of the article. See
Robert Hockett, It Takes A Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings And
Public/Private Partnerships For Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation,
and Local Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 121, 123-24 nn. 3-6, 11,
126-27 nn. 22, 25, 133-35 nn. 53, 60, 62, 64, 137 n. 68, 157 n. 107 (2012). His
articles are further cited therein.
66. Hockett, supra note 21, at 6 (footnotes omitted).
67. See id. at 6, nn. 12-13.
68. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160, 172 (1998)
(holding that the interest earned on funds held in a lawyer's trust account ("IOLTA")
was the private property of the owner of the principal, i.e., the client, and as such was
subject to the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; Phillips
did not answer the question as to whether the State of Texas statute that required banks
to forward the interest earned on IOLTA accounts to the State for distribution to
foundations to finance legal services for low-income persons was a taking); Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 41, 48 (1960) (a supplier of material to a shipbuilder
pursuant to a contract was entitled to the property rights under a materialman's lien
created by state law and the federal government's destruction of those property lien
rights was held to be a taking of private property that required the payment of just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); see also Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870).
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dedication of land to a local government for streets and alleys that led to an
inverse condemnation action by a lender to protect its property interest
created by a mortgage 69 and another that specifically concerns mortgages in
the context of federal bankruptcy legislation.70
1. Municipal Ownership ofDedicated Land
A lender's inverse condemnation action to protect the priority of its
property interest (based on its mortgage lien) over a local government
interest in dedicated property does not directly address the outright
condemnation of a mortgage by eminent domain.n In Western Fertilizer &
Cordage Co. Inc. v. City of Alliance, developer BRG, Inc. purchased a
particular parcel from Western and later the local city approved BRG's plat
that contained dedications of certain portions of the parcel to the city for
streets, alleys, and public land.72 Later, when the balloon payment on the
purchase price matured, BRG signed a note and mortgage in favor of seller-
Western and the subject parcel became the collateral for the loan.73 After
the mortgage loan was created, BRG dedicated more land to the city. 74
When the developer defaulted, Western filed a complaint for foreclosure
and eventually obtained title to the property under a sheriffs deed." After
the city insisted its rights to the dedicated land were superior to that of
Western's property rights as a secured lender, Western filed an inverse
condemnation action against the city. 76 Due to competing priority of
interests, the discrepancies in the legal description of the collateral property
in the mortgage and the legal description of the foreclosed property in the
sheriffs deed, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the city. 77 The court concluded that a
mortgagee does not need to have title or possession of the subject property
in order for a governmental taking of a property interest to occur.78
Thus, a local government could be required to pay just compensation
when it accepts the dedication of land and then asserts an ownership
interest in such land that it claims is superior to a lender's mortgage lien
69. W. Fertilizer & Cordage Co. v. Alliance, 504 N.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Neb.
1993).
70. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1935).
71. W. Fertilizer, 504 N.W.2d at 808.
72. Id. at 811.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 819-20.
78. Id. at 816, 819.
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interest. Such a rule is markedly distinguishable from the locality's
initiation of an eminent domain proceeding solely to condemn mortgage
promissory notes located outside city limits.
The Western case is distinguishable from the City of Richmond plan.
Western dealt with a municipality's assertion of ownership rights to
dedicated land located within that city's territorial jurisdiction and claimed
that it had priority over a lender's mortgage security interest in the same
land. Western did not address a direct, forced taking of mortgage notes
held by a lender located outside city limits.
2. Bankruptcy Court Reduction ofMortgage Principal Balance
Federal bankruptcy legislation and related cases have a direct impact on
lenders' property interests through bankruptcy courts' authority to strip
down or strip off a mortgage from bankrupt debtors' real property under
certain circumstances. 9 In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,so
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Depression-era Frazier-Lemke
Act (an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act)81 after the debtor's lender
successfully intervened in the bankruptcy case to assert a constitutional
challenge against the Act under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court concluded that:
[since] the act as applied has [taken a property interest from the bank
without compensation], we must hold it void; for the Fifth Amendment
commands that, however great the nation's need, private property shall not
be thus taken even for a wholly public use without just compensation. If the
public interest requires, and permits, the taking of property of individual
mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors,
resort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so that, through
taxation, the burden of the relief afforded in the public interest may be
borne by the public.82
The Court recognized that the Act had the purpose "to preserve to the
79. This Article does not analyze the circumstances under which bankruptcy
courts can or cannot strip down or strip off mortgages from the collateral real property.
This topic remains an issue, as the U.S. Supreme Court on November 17, 2014 granted
a writ of certiorari and on March 24, 2015 heard oral argument in the consolidated
cases of Bank of America v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, 2014 WL 2207208 (U.S. Nov. 17,
2014) and Bank of America v. Toledo-Cardona, No. 14-163, 2014 WL 3965212 (U.S.
Nov. 17, 2014) to address the question: Does Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code
permit a chapter 7 debtor to "strip off' a junior mortgage lien in its entirety when the
outstanding debt owed to a senior lienholder exceeds the current value of the collateral?
See Caulkett, 2014 WL2207208, at *3 (outlining the question presented); Toledo-
Cardona, 2014 WL3965212, at *3.
80. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
81. See id. at 572-73.
82. Id. at 601-02.
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mortgagor the ownership and enjoyment of the farm property" and had an
"avowed object. .. to take from the mortgagee rights in the specific
property held as security ... and. . . 'to scale down the indebtedness' to
the present value of the property."83  To achieve these goals, the Act
worked to take property rights from the bank.84 In light of the substantive
limitations on the character of the bank's mortgage that the Act imposed,
the Court stated, "[i]f a part of the mortgaged property were taken by
eminent domain, a mortgagee would receive payment on a similar basis."8 5
Thus, the Radford Court recognized that if the underlying land were taken,
the mortgagee's property interest would be impacted, as well, entitling it to
compensation just as the landowner would receive payment. As a result,
Radford concluded that a bankruptcy law that significantly alters a
mortgage lien such that essential property rights are all but destroyed is
invalid.8 7
Inasmuch as the Radford opinion strongly defended private property
rights, it is no wonder that the ruling has been criticized" and
83. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 594-95 ("As here applied it has taken from the Bank the following
property rights recognized by the Law of Kentucky: (1) The right to retain the lien
until the indebtedness thereby secured is paid. (2) The right to realize upon the security
by a judicial public sale. (3) The right to determine when such sale shall be held,
subject only to the discretion of the court. (4) The right to protect its interest in the
property by bidding at such sale whenever held, and thus to assure having the
mortgaged property devoted primarily to the satisfaction of the debt, either through
receipt of the proceeds of a fair competitive sale or by taking the property itself. (5)
The right to control meanwhile the property during the period of default, subject only
to the discretion of the court, and to have the rents and profits collected by a receiver
for the satisfaction of the debt.").
85. Id. at 596 (referencing the taking of real property and not the mortgage itself as
personal property).
86. However, in a condemnation proceeding when a municipality takes land with
interests held by a fee owner-borrower and by a mortgage lender, there is an
apportionment of the compensation paid. In California where there are divided
interests in the property (e.g., the fee owner and a trust deed beneficiary), the
condemnor in an eminent domain proceeding can require the trier of fact to determine
the compensation to be paid to all defendants, who then can produce evidence as to
their respective interests and right to all or a portion of the compensation, which the
trier of fact shall apportion according to proof. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1260.220
(West 2015).
87. Radford, 295 U.S. at 601-602. The Radford court did not address the possible
result if Congress had set out a mechanism within the Act to provide lenders with just
compensation when debtors were granted mortgage relief under the Act.
88. In re Yi, 219 B.R. 394, 401 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("[L]ien avoidance under the
federal bankruptcy power 'does not come within the traditional definitions of takings
under the Fifth Amendment."' (Citation omitted)); In re A.V.B.I., Inc., 143 B.R. 738,
746 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); Pillow v. Avco Fin. Servs., 8 B.R. 404, 411 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1981). Radford, a 1935 case, was decided just prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's
remarkable shift in the 1930s and 1940s toward greater deference to government and
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distinguished. 8 9 Nevertheless, it remains viable and it has been relied upon
in more recent opinions. 90 Radford provides a cautionary flag in that it
acknowledges that private property rights ought to be protected when
government asserts its enumerated bankruptcy power.9 ' The line of cases
that follow Radford hold to the principle that the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause protects lenders' private property interests notwithstanding
the bankruptcy setting.
The courts that criticize Radford conclude that the Takings Clause does
not impede the authority of bankruptcy courts, though the secured
mortgage and the related property interest may be directly affected by court
orders. Such courts place an emphasis on the policy that Congress intended
the bankruptcy statutes to grant relief so that debtors have a fresh start, and
further reason that to achieve the policy goal, such statutes cannot be made
vulnerable to a takings claim.92 Though the treatment of debtors under the
law has a checkered past, there is a longstanding regard for the principle
that debtors often need to be unburdened by oppressive debt that goes at
least as far back as the Old Testament in the Bible.93  Since bankruptcy
away from earlier closer scrutiny of legislation that impacted private contracts.
89. See Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300
U.S. 440, 455-56 (1937); see, e.g., Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 450-53
(1937).
90. See Rodrock v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 1981) ("
Counsel suggests that, with the passage of time, Radford has lost its steam and that
later decisions of the Supreme Court cast doubt on the continuing vitality of that
decision. We disagree. Such cases . . . may well refine the rule of Radford, but they do
not destroy the fundamental teaching of Radford that Congress may not under the
bankruptcy power completely take for the benefit of a debtor rights in specific property
previously acquired by a creditor." Footnote 5 in Rodrock states, "We note that, not
only has Radford never been overruled, either expressly or impliedly, but it has
continued to be cited by the Supreme Court. Rodrock, 642 F.2d at 1197 n.5 (citing
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44 (1960)); see also, In re A.V.B.I., Inc., 143
B.R. at 746 (citing United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 74 (1982) to
acknowledge the U.S. Supreme Court's reliance on Radford "for the proposition that
there are Fifth Amendment limitations on the extent to which the bankruptcy statutes
can 'be used to defeat traditional property interests,' like lien rights").
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
92. See, e.g., In re Pillow, 8 B.R. 404, 411, 420 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)
("Furthermore, Congress recognized that 'one of the primary purposes 6f the
bankruptcy act is to "relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes." This purpose of the act has
been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as private
interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for
distribution that property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity
in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt."' (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934) (emphasis and citations omitted)).
93. Deuteronomy 15:1-11.
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mortgage relief is a direct challenge to a lender's property interests (by
"'stripping down"' or "'stripping off" the mortgage lien from the debtor's
real property), the significance of the clash between the policy to give
debtors a fresh start and the protection of private personal property interests
cannot be underestimated. Bankruptcy courts have worked through the
reasoning to balance these two competing interests, but this Article does
not describe the dividing line in the bankruptcy context. Instead, this
Article briefly examines the City's plan in light of the fresh start policy.
Both the bankruptcy statutes and the City's plan have the potential to
directly deprive a lender of its personal property interest. Since there is a
dearth of cases on point, the City will likely distinguish Radford and assert
the general proposition that it can condemn mortgage notes outright, an act
roughly analogous to the stripping off of the mortgage balance and lien.
Accordingly, it is of value to examine the City's plan in light of the
bankruptcy courts' fresh start policy. Bankruptcy courts rely on federal
legislation based on a constitutionally enumerated power and the policy of
a debtor's fresh start to enable a debtor to request a court to grant mortgage
debt relief in the form of stripping down or stripping the loan principal.
The City's plan, if implemented, would condemn mortgage notes without
enabling legislation in order to directly force the lender, without its
consent, to relinquish the entirety of its personal property interest through
an eminent domain sale. What fresh start does the City and MRP provide
for the borrower and for the City? After immediate protection pursuant to
the bankruptcy court's automatic stay, a debtor-borrower can seek court
approval of a loan repayment plan-the debtor enjoys a fresh start as he
regains his financial footing over time and eventually the lender is made
whole. The City's plan, however, does not require anything from the
borrower and fails to make the lender whole. In fact, the lender's position
is worse as it would be forced to sell at what appears to be below market
price. Also, the City's form of a "fresh start" is actually a windfall because
the borrower is given a new mortgage with a reduced loan principal and
with better terms.94 The borrower would clearly be in a much better
position as a result of the strong-arm tactic of eminent domain that forces
his lender to suffer a loss.
A bankruptcy court judge and an appointed bankruptcy trustee evaluate
the details of a debtor's income, expenses, and debts before the decision to
grant a fresh start is made. The City, on the other hand, has not made and
most likely will not make an evaluation of a borrower's general financial
circumstances or of the specific mortgage. The City simply has taken
94. See Res. No. 120-13, Richmond City Council 1 6 (Cal. 2013), available at
http://www.alicelaw.org/uploads/asset/assetfile/1955/2013_RichmondResolution_12
0.pdf
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MRP's recommendation on which mortgages to condemn. The City and
MRP primarily select borrowers who are current with their loan payments,
unlike bankruptcy courts that have discharged the debts or equitably
divided among creditors the assets of borrowers overwhelmed with debt.
Under the City's and MRP's plan, approximately 624 mortgagors would
receive a better loan, giving the term "relief' a new meaning. Moreover,
there does not appear to be a current thought to provide a "fresh start" to
the multitude of other borrowers who live within city limits.
Further, the City would not experience a fresh start. The restructuring of
624 targeted mortgages is too few to make a significant difference and it
would be speculative to claim that blight conditions would be reduced
(even if detectable). Even if defaults and foreclosures were to actually
exist in such numbers as to pose a real threat, it would be far better to
contain such a threat through public nuisance and other -ordinances,95 as
well as background principles of state property law, 96 rather than to push
the public use requirement into practical extinction. Although the
purchase and resale of mortgages may provide profits for the City and
MRP, it is unlikely that the City's financial condition would be relieved of
the pressure of long-term debts, subsidies, and entitlement programs.98 As
95. See e.g., RICHMOND MUN. CODE §§ 9.22.010-140 (2014); see also Eagle,
supra note 49, at 836.
96. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n., 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992).
97. See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(warning that the public use requirement may cease to exist after this decision); see
also Steven J. Eagle, A Resurgent "Public Use" Clause Is Consistent With Fairness, 19
APR. PROB. & PROP. 18, 19 (2005) (a pre-Kelo article that draws attention to local
government's use of condemnation as a "marketing tool" to draw business and to
judicial conflation of "public use" and "public purpose." Further, the article comments
on the then recent decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004), to say, "[a]lthough the Hathcock approach is hardly perfect, it does illustrate that
only in rare instances does a town's economic survival depend on condemnation of a
few specific parcels for resale").
98. Generally, recent history has shown that governmental officials at all levels
have increased the number of programs and their budgets, and rarely if ever have
terminated a program. This practice, as recounted on the daily news, has led the federal
government and many state and local governments to accumulate a significant and
perhaps irreversible amount of debt. In fact, municipal bankruptcies are apt to be more
common in recent times, like that of the filing by the City of Detroit, Michigan. See
Matt Helms, Nancy Kaffer & Stephen Henderson, Detroit Files For Bankruptcy,
Setting Off Battles With Creditors, Pensions, Unions, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jul. 19,
2013, 7:47 AM),
http://www.freep.com/article/20130718/NEWS0 1/307180107/Detroit-bankruptcy-
filing-Kevyn-Orr-emergency-manager. For an article regarding Detroit and other large
cities with financial trouble, see generally Todd Spangler, Detroit Not Alone Under
Mountain Of Long-Term Debt, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jul. 22, 2013, 3:21 PM),
http://www.freep.com/article/20130721/NEWS06/307210073/detroit-bankruptcy-
pension-benefits-unfunded-liability.
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a result, Richmond citizens would not see a fresh start but rather, would
probably face higher taxes or a reduction in fundamental services so that
officials' preferred programs are created, maintained, or expanded. 99
Thus, a city council that puts itself in the lending business or in the
secondary mortgage market does not create a fresh start. If the plan merely
called upon the City to condemn existing loans and to serve as a one-time
"broker" that sells the restructured loans, there would still not be a fresh
start for the larger community, and consequently no public use. Whether as
a long-term participant or a one-time broker in the private mortgage
market, the City abrogates its fundamental role of protecting lives and
property.
Let us suppose there is indeed a fresh start for the few as a result of the
plan. The question becomes whether the plan is an excessive exercise of
the power to condemn property. It is reasonable to conclude that municipal
legislatures have not wisely used the power to condemn property if we
were to gauge current practices in light of the historical understanding of
eminent domain, the emphasis on paternalism, and the more frequent use of
central economic planning. As a token gesture in recognition of James
Madison's comment that if angels were to govern men there would be no
need for internal or external controls of government,100 state legislatures
throughout the country have promulgated statutory measures to protect
against municipal overreach through the taking of property.101
III. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL CONDEMNATION OF MORTGAGE NOTES
California, like many other states, uses its constitution1 02 and
legislation1 0 3 to authorize its political subdivisions to condemn property
99. The author calls upon himself and his readers to be realistic about the methods
of governance practiced by elected officials and bureaucrats. More importantly, the
author and his readers must face the consequences of re-electing officials who continue
current practices, and must bring about a robust revival of the political remedy of
elections.
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
101. The men (or women) who are in office or serve as government employees
make mere token gestures to be restrained under a system of checks and balances
because, in the author's opinion, these same public servants appear to be in the constant
pursuit of ways to circumvent the very statutory protective measures they draft and
enact. To be fair, it is important to recall that it is often the judiciary's deference to
legislative action and minimal scrutiny of regulation that impacts fundamental property
rights that enable the circumvention.
102. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a) ("Private property may be taken or damaged for a
public use and only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has
first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.").
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE CIV. P. § 1230.020 (2015) ("Except as otherwise
specifically provided by statute, the power of eminent domain may be exercised only as
provided in this title."); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 ("property" for a
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through eminent domain. Without enabling law, local government cannot
freely act to take property.1 04 With enabling law, local municipalities can
initiate eminent domain proceedings, but there are limits imposed on the
power. 05 Most relevant to the City's plan is the statutory provision that
concerns the location of the property to be taken. Generally, a local
government or agency lacks the power to take property that is outside its
territorial jurisdiction unless there is a specific statute that authorizes the
taking 0 6 "or [the power is] necessarily implied as an incident of one of its
other statutory powers."07 Rather than review the issues of public use, just
compensation, and impairment of contract raised by the Richmond plan,
this Article takes a closer look at the California law that concerns extra-
territorial condemnation.
A. The California Constitution and the Power ofEminent Domain
The California Constitution expressly prohibits state and local
government from acquiring through eminent domain an owner-occupied
residence so that it can transfer it to a private person. 0 8 This prohibition
does not apply, however, if state or local government condemns property
"for the purpose of protecting public health and safety; preventing serious,
repeated, criminal activity; responding to an emergency; remedying
environmental contamination that poses a threat to public health and
safety[;]" 09 or "acquiring private property for a public work or
improvement."" 0 Thus, there is no express constitutional authority to
condemn: i) a residential real estate loan promissory note; ii) an owner-
occupied residence in order to transfer it to a private person; or, iii)
property for economic revitalization. Unless the condemnation,
restructuring, and reselling of a residential mortgage loan is construed to
fall within one of the stated purposes, the City of Richmond must look for
"proposed project"); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5540 (2015) (real or personal property for
exercise of powers by a regional park and other districts for such things as an open-
space easement); CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 37353 (2015) (real property for parking and
streets). See generally Harden v. Superior Court, 284 P.2d 9, 14-15 (Cal. 1955).
104. San Francisco v. Ross, 279 P.2d 529, 530-31 (Cal. 1955); see also CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1230.020 (2015).
105. Ross, 279 P.2d at 531; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1230.020 (2015).
Post Kelo cases outside of California have reinforced the point that under state law
there are limits placed on the power of eminent domain. See, e.g., Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 646 (Okla. 2006) (citing Kelo, (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
106. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE CIV. P. § 1240.050 (West 2015).
107. Id.
108. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(b).
109. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(c).
110. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(d).
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legal authority in a state statute.
B. California Statutes and the Power ofEminent Domain
California's eminent domain law establishes the procedures for eminent
domain proceedings.' "A city may acquire by eminent domain any
property necessary to carry out any of its powers or functions."ll2 The
extent of city powers or functions must be determined of course. Whether
a city actually condemns property by eminent domain is a decision that is
left to the city official's discretion.' 13 The breadth of statutory
condemnation authority expands to enable a city to acquire personal or real
property located within or beyond city limits, and to convey such property,
as well: "The legislative body may purchase, lease, exchange, or receive
such personal property and real estate situated inside or outside the city
limits as is necessary or proper for municipal purposes. It may control,
dispose of, and convey such property for the benefit of the city."11 4 An
acquisition of a residential mortgage promissory note possessed outside of
Richmond city limits must be shown by the City to be "necessary or proper
for municipal purposes." 15 It has yet to be shown in California case law
that a locality's condemnation of residential mortgage promissory notes is a
municipal purpose, much less a necessary or proper one. Standard
definitions of local government purposes do not involve the public entity's
participation in the secondary mortgage market by condemning a mortgage
loan in order to restructure the original loan terms and then selling the new
loan. 16
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.050 declares that a
local public entity117 can acquire property only within its territorial limits,
111. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE CIV. P. §§ 1230.010 et seq (West 2015).
112. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 37350.5 (2015).
113. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1230.030 (West 2015) ("Nothing in this title requires
that the power of eminent domain be exercised to acquire property necessary for public
use. Whether property necessary for public use is to be acquired by purchase or other
means or by eminent domain is a decision left to the discretion of the person authorized
to acquire the property.").
114. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 37351 (West 2015) (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. The California Supreme Court has taken a strict construction approach to the
interpretation of statues that concern the condemnation of extra-territorial property.
See Harden v. Superior Court, 284 P.2d 9, 17 (Cal. 1955) (citing Madera v. Black, 184
P. 397, 400-01 (Cal. 1919), which stated that "It is the settled law of this state and the
general rule everywhere that language purporting to define the powers of a municipal
corporation is to be strictly construed, and that any fair, reasonable doubt concerning
the existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the [municipal] corporation,
and the power is denied") (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1235.190 (West 2015) ("Public entity" is defined to
include "the state, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other
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but can exceed its boundary if the entity shows that it has been given the
power to condemn by express statutory authority, or if the power is
necessarily implied from some other statutorily authorized power." 8
Express statutory authority is understandably granted to a public entity to
go beyond its territorial limits for the purposes of water, gas, electrical
supply, airports, drainage or sewer purposes if there is statutory
authorization.l19 Such services are commonly understood to fall within
core governmental functions because the services are fundamental
infrastructure needs of a community.
C. California Case Law and the Condemnation ofExtra-Territorial
Property
There is a fairly bright line when the state enacts legislation that
delineates the governmental purposes for which condemnation of extra-
territorial property can be undertaken. Water, gas, electricity, airports,
drainage, and sewerage purposes illustrate this point. As for the power to
condemn extra-territorial property by eminent domain that is necessarily
implied, California courts explain when a public entity may effectuate the
extra-territorial taking.
1. Court Jurisdiction Over an Eminent Domain Proceeding
Initially, it is essential to point out that the California Supreme Court has
held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to try an eminent domain
proceeding if the local municipality lacks extra-territorial jurisdiction to
condemn property located outside its boundaries. 120 In Harden v. Superior
Court, the Hardens, who owned land outside of the City of Hayward,
California in June of 1954, obtained from the County of Alameda a
building permit to erect a department store building.121 In October 1954,
the City of Hayward passed a resolution to condemn the Hardens' property,
and other land, for the purpose of an off-street parking area. 122 The City
political subdivision in the state.").
118. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.050 (West 2015) ("A local public entity may
acquire by eminent domain only property within its territorial limits except where the
power to acquire by eminent domain property outside its limits is expressly granted by
statute or necessarily implied as an incident of one of its other statutory powers.").
119. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.125 (West 2015) ("Except as otherwise
expressly provided by statute and subject to any limitations imposed by statute, a local
public entity may acquire property by eminent domain outside its territorial limits for
water, gas, or electric supply purposes or for airports, drainage or sewer purposes if it is
authorized to acquire property by eminent domain for the purposes for which the
property is to be acquired.").
120. Harden, 284 P.2d at 14-15, 17.
121. Id. at 11-12.
122. Id.
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filed a complaint to condemn the land by eminent domain. 12 3 When the
Hardens' demurrer was overruled, they filed a writ of prohibition against
the trial court. 124 The California Supreme Court held that the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled on the demurrer and issued the writ
of prohibition against the lower court. 125 The court concluded that the writ
of prohibition was the appropriate remedy despite the lack of a final
judgment, where it appeared that a "failure of justice would occur in a
matter of public importance by a wrongful or excessive exercise of
jurisdiction" and that the petitioner-landowners "do not have a speedy and
adequate remedy by appeal under the circumstances [t]here presented."l26
The court found there to be a lack of jurisdiction because the City of
Hayward did not have the express legal authority to condemn property
beyond its boundaries because under precedent case law the term
"purchase" in California Government Code Section 37351 must be strictly
construed to prohibit extra-territorial condemnation of property.1 27 put
briefly, since the municipality did not have jurisdiction to condemn
property outside its boundaries, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
rule on the landowners' demurrer.1 28 Condemning agencies would initiate
eminent domain proceedings for naught.
2. California's Statutory Scheme for the Condemnation of Extra-
Territorial Property
Based on City Resolution No. 120-13, it is fair to assume that the City
believes that the metrics of the City's conditions regarding residential
housing values, defaults, and foreclosures support a resolution of necessity
for the mortgage condemnation plan, and that the plan satisfies the
constitutional criteria of public use and just compensation. Nevertheless,
its proposed plan cannot get very far since there is no statutory provision in
state law that specifically permits the condemnation of residential mortgage
loans. A broad provision such as Government Code Section 37351 will not
suffice either,1 2 9 which, pursuant to the holding in Harden, would leave a
trial court without jurisdiction.
An alternative argument for the City requires it to claim that its power to
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 17.
126. Id. at 13-14.
127. Id. at 16-17.
128. Id. at 14 ("[W]hen it is shown that the court, in overruling the demurrer is
proceeding without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, prohibition may
issue."). See generally, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1102, 1103 (West 2015).
129. See supra notes 114 and 127 and accompanying text.
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condemn residential mortgage notes is "necessarily implied as an incident
of one of its other statutory powers."'3 0 This may prove difficult in that
few agree that the handling of transactions in the secondary mortgage
market is a local government function.13 ' A review of California cases
provides an analytical approach to the issue of a necessarily implied power
to condemn property.
The opinion in Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court (hereinafter
"Mebane")132 provides a good step-by-step analysis of California eminent
domain law in the context of a local flood district's unsuccessful effort to
condemn property outside its territorial limits for the purpose of
environmental mitigation. Where a specific flood district is given express
statutory authority to condemn property outside its boundaries "to
construct, maintain, or operate a necessary 'water' or 'drainage'
improvement," the district, nonetheless, lacks the authority to condemn
extra-territorial property for a purpose that is not set out in statutes that
generally speak of the power to condemn extra-territorial property. 133 "A
statutory grant of eminent domain power must be indicated by express
terms or by clear implication," and courts will strictly construe statutory
language and resolve reasonable doubts against the municipality.1 34 The
court did not find a basis for an extra-territorial taking in the specific flood
district regulation's express language or in a specific statute within
California's eminent domain law. 35
For the Mebane court to find that the flood district did not have express
statutory authority for its condemnation effort, it engaged in a thorough
analysis as to whether California law grants an implied power to a public
agency to condemn property outside its limits. The court analyzed the
alternative "necessarily implied" basis for such condemnation in Section
1240.050 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. The court's train of
130. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.050 (West 2015).
131. Here, secondary mortgage market activity is meant to include the purchase and
resale of a residential mortgage loan that already exists, whether a chartered bank,
licensed real estate mortgage broker, or a local municipality undertakes the activity.
132. Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
133. Id. at 566-67. The flood district in Kenneth Mebane Ranches sought to
condemn extra-territorial property under its enabling statute in order to conduct
environmental mitigation in an improvement within the district.
134. Id. at 565-66.
135. Id. at 566; see, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.125 (West 2015) ("Except as
otherwise expressly provided by statute and subject to any limitations imposed by
statute, a local public entity may acquire property by eminent domain outside its
territorial limits for water, gas, or electric supply purposes or for airports, drainage or
sewer purposes if it is authorized to acquire property by eminent domain for the
purpose for which the property is to be acquired." (emphasis added)).
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thought provides several elements that must be met before such an implied
power is found. In Mebane, the question was whether the flood district had
an implied power to condemn extra-territorial property for the purpose of
environmental mitigation. The court said no. The question for the City of
Richmond is whether California law enables it to exercise an implied
power to condemn residential mortgage loans located outside city limits,
since state law does not grant express statutory authority to a public entity
to condemn loans regardless of the location.
a. The Standard to Establish an Implied Power to Condemn
The first element that is established under California's statutory scheme
and prior case law requires a condemnor to demonstrate a "legal necessity"
before it can proceed to take property outside its boundaries. The court in
Mebane so concluded after it compared the "necessarily implied" phrase in
Section 1240.050136 and the "necessary for the project" phrase in Section
1240.030.137
The provisions in Section 1240.030, the Mebane court said, "require
only a reasonable necessity under all the circumstances of the case and not
an absolute or imperative necessity.'038  In contrast, Section 1240.050
"involves a jurisdictional issue, a question of law to be determined by the
court[,]" and as the court noted, the Legislative Committee Comment stated
that Section 1240.050 had codified prior law that had "applied a higher
standard than reasonable or practical necessity." 3 9  The prior law that
established the higher standard included Carlsbad v. Wight,14 0 which held:
"While the record disclosed that the city may have shown practical
necessity, there was no showing of 'urgency, or extreme expediency, or
legal necessity, or that the proposed taking [was] indispensible."'1 41 In
136. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.050 (West 2015) ("A local public entity may
acquire by eminent domain only property within its territorial limits except where the
power to acquire by eminent domain property outside its limits is expressly granted by
statute or necessarily implied as an incident of one of its other statutory powers."
(emphasis added)).
137. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (West 2015) ("The power of eminent
domain may be exercised to acquire property for a proposed project only if all of the
following are established: (a) The public interest and necessity require the project. (b)
The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the
greatest public good and the least private injury. (c) The property sought to be
acquired is necessary for the project." (emphasis added)).
138. Kenneth Mebane Ranches, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 566-67.
139. Id. at 567-68.
140. 34 Cal. Rptr. 820, 825 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
141. Kenneth Mebane Ranches, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 568 (The Court in City of
Carlsbad v. Wight, rejected the city's effort to condemn property outside its limits so
that it could relocate a storm drainage canal on it.) (emphasis added).
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another case, Los Angeles v. Koyer, 142 the court stated:
A grant of the power of eminent domain, which is one of the attributes of
sovereignty most fraught with the possibility of abuse and injustice, will
never pass by implication, and when the power is granted, the extent to
which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear
implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.1 4 3
As if the quoted prior law had not done so, the court in Mebane
emphasized the higher standard in Section 1240.050 when it stated:
Because the Legislature intended to codify prior law when it enacted
section 1240.050, it must have incorporated the prevailing standard
applicable to determine when the power of extraterritorial condemnation
will be necessarily implied as an incident to a local public entity's other
enumerated powers. That standard requires the power of extraterritorial
condemnation to be a matter of "urgency of extreme expediency or
necessity," or "manifestly desirable," or "essential to the declared objects"
of the local public entity [citations omitted], or indicated by "clear
implication" [citation omitted].1 44
The court went on to describe the higher standard as "legal necessity." 4 5
Despite the legislative comments that spoke of a local municipality's
demonstration of a reasonable necessity, the Mebane court applied the
more demanding "legal necessity" standard.1 4 6 Thus, according to this
appellate court, a local municipality must demonstrate more than
reasonable necessity. As noted in the excerpt above from Mebane, to meet
the "legal necessity" standard, a local public entity's resolution of necessity
must describe the circumstances in which the exercise of the power of an
extra-territorial taking is something of an "urgency of extreme expediency
or necessity," is "manifestly desirable," is "essential to the declared
objects" of the entity, or is "indicated by clear implication."'47 The
requirements of a resolution of necessity and related presumptions are set
out in California eminent domain law 4 8 and are discussed below in sub-
142. 192 P. 301, 302-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920).
143. Kenneth Mebane Ranches, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 568 (The Court in City of Los
Angeles v. Koyer, reversed a judgment for the city, which sought to construct a public
wharf for commerce and to condemn land that was several blocks from the wharf to
construct public warehouses for the purpose of operating the wharf) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 567.
146. The Mebane court acknowledged that the last paragraph of the Legislative
Committee Comment to Section 1240.050 referred to necessity as "only a reasonable
necessity". However, the court distinguished the two cases cited in the Comment, and
held that "legal necessity" was the appropriate standard. Id. at 568-70.
147. Kenneth Mebane Ranches, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 568.
148. For the mandate to enact a resolution of necessity, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
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part (i).
The Mebane court's comments regarding the contrast between Section
1240.050 and Section 1240.030 highlight the critical distinction in views
between the City of Richmond and the trustees of the mortgage-backed
securities trusts that filed the underlying lawsuit.1 4 9 The opposing views
turn on the threshold questions: (1) the location of the residential mortgage
loans; and (2) whether location makes the City's plan an extra-territorial
taking. Section 1240.030 does not address extra-territorial takings and
requires a "reasonable necessity under all the circumstances of the case."
This corresponds to the City's position that it does not need specific
statutory authorization for a taking of property outside its boundaries since
the residential mortgage loans are located within city limits under what it
claims to be a "totality-of-the-circumstances test"150 established by the
California Supreme Court in Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (hereinafter
Oakland Raiders 1).151 The City also relies on other U.S. Supreme Court
and California case law that generally focuses on creditors' and residential
mortgage lenders' remedies. The opposing trustees maintain that, pursuant
to U.S. Supreme Court and California cases that resolved escheat and
taxation issues, the applicable rule is that debts are owned by the creditors
and are, thus, located wherever the creditors are domiciled.15 2 The trustees
also rely on the territorial limitations of Section 1240.050 to further support
their position that the mortgage loans have an extra-territorial location.
No case has ruled on where a residential mortgage loan is located for the
purpose of determining whether a public entity's exercise of eminent
domain power seeks to take extra-territorial property. It is unclear how a
California court would rule. The City and MRP rely on the California
Supreme Court's factors in Oakland Raiders I to posit that the location of
intangible property, such as mortgage loans, is within the territorial limits
of the condemnor.153
Significantly, the California Supreme Court's opinion in Oakland
Raiders I did not decide the question of the location of the partnership
ownership interest in a National Football League franchise team targeted
for condemnation. The court identified the City of Oakland as the principal
§§ 1245.220, 1240.040 (West 2015) ("A public entity may not commence an eminent
domain proceeding until its governing body has adopted a resolution of necessity that
meets the requirements of this article."). For the requisite information of a resolution
of necessity, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (West 2015).
149. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
150. Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra note 34, at 17-19.
151. 32 Cal. 3d 60 (previously published at 31 Cal. 3d 656) (1982) ("Oakland
Raiders I").
152. Pls' Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra note 38, at 6-7.
153. Def's Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra note 34, at 18-19.
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place of business of the partnership, the location of the team's home games,
and the location of the team's tangible personal property. 154 The court then
stated:
We readily acknowledge that there may be similar or additional factors
which would be relevant in determining the appropriate scope of a city's
power of condemnation. In fairness, that power must have reasonable
limitations. Prima facie, however, such territorial restrictions seem to be
satisfied, although we most certainly do not preclude a trial court, on an
appropriate factual record, from concluding otherwise.'55
The court remanded to the trial court because it "[did] not decide
whether City has a meritorious condemnation claim in this case. City's
ability to prove a valid public use for its proposed action remains
untested."' 56 The court added that Oakland should have the opportunity to
prove its case according to the "established legal principles" and the trial
court could render a different conclusion on an adequate record.'5 7
Interestingly, Chief Justice Byrd concurred in the conclusion but strongly
dissented:
The power of eminent domain claimed by the City in this case is not
only novel but virtually without limit. This is troubling because the
potential for abuse of such a great power is boundless. Although I am
forced by the current state of the law to agree with the result reached by the
majority, I have not signed their opinion because it endorses this
unprecedented application of eminent domain law without even pausing to
consider the ultimate consequences of their expansive decision. It should be
noted that research both by the parties and by this court has failed to
disclose a single case in which the legal propositions relied on here have
been combined to reach a result such as that adopted by the majority.'58
Chief Justice Byrd had serious concerns about the majority's declaration
that "established legal principles" actually were to be applied without
precedent for the condemnation of a going concern. Eventually, an
appellate court reversed the trial court when it held that Section 1240.050
did not apply to intangible property (as the California Supreme Court had
stated) and that the Raiders had not rebutted Oakland's prima facie
showing that the partnership interest was located in Oakland.15 9 This
154. Oakland Raiders 1, 32 Cal. 3d at 74 (previously published at 31 Cal. 3d at
682).
155. Oakland Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d at 74-75 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 76. The Court reversed the trial court's order that had granted the
Raiders' motion for summary judgment.
157. Id. at 75, 76.
158. Id. at 76-77 (Byrd. C.J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (emphasis
added).
159. Oakland v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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appellate court's holding was consistent with but did not elaborate on the
California Supreme Court's discussion of the factors regarding the location
of the partnership interest. The scant facts about the partnership location
suggest that both the California Supreme Court and the court in City of
Oakland concentrated on whether the partnership interest was
geographically fixed in Oakland city limits, which takes on a minimum
contacts form of analysis.160 Ultimately, the City of Oakland was not able
to condemn the partnership interest because it violated the federal
Commerce Clause. 161
Notably, neither the California Supreme Court in Oakland Raiders I nor
the City of Oakland appellate court explained why Section 1240.050 did
not apply to intangible property, though the California Supreme Court did
state that intangible property does not have a "permanent situs." 6 2
Curiously, this suggests that any provision within California's eminent
domain law that does not specifically refer to "personal property,"
"intangible property," or "any property" could not provide authority for a
local municipality's condemnation of any species of intangible property.
For example, in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1230.030,163
the discretion to condemn "property" that is granted would be limited only
to real property. To add to the confusion created by the interpretation of
Section 1240.050, the California Supreme Court in Oakland Raiders I cited
Section 1235.170, which provides the definition of property: "'Property'
includes real and personal property and any interest therein." 6 4 Personal
property is commonly understood to include intangible and tangible
property. In addition, the California Supreme Court opinion in Harden
160. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. In Mayor ofBaltimore v. Baltimore
Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 284-85 (1986), Baltimore argued that the Colts
football team had "sufficient contacts with the state of Maryland" and that since the
"Court [could] assert jurisdiction over the team, the City therefore has power to
condemn the club." The Baltimore Colts court rejected the City's argument, and turned
to the factors that guided the California Supreme Court in the Oakland Raiders I case.
The Baltimore Colts court noted that the City of Oakland had started its eminent
domain action before the Raiders left for Los Angeles, and found that the Colts had
abandoned Maryland, had removed its personal property from Maryland, and had
informed the NFL of a possible move of its home games which went without response
by the NFL.
161. Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
("Oakland Raiders I").
162. Oakland Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d at 74.
163. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1230.030 (West 2015) ("Nothing in this title requires
that the power of eminent domain be exercised to acquire property necessary for public
use. Whether property necessary for public use is to be acquired by purchase or other
means or by eminent domain is a decision left to the discretion of the person authorized
to acquire the property."). See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
164. Oakland Raiders 1, 32 Cal. 3d at 65.
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calls for strict construction of provisions in the state's eminent domain
law. 165 Under a Harden strict construction, the term "property" found in
Section 1240.050 ought to include intangible personal property. The
muddle created by the Supreme Court in Oakland Raiders I contrasts
greatly with the methodical and consistent approach taken by the appellate
court in Mebane.166 Moreover, the Oakland Raiders I case may have
involved intangible personal property in the form of a partnership
ownership in a NFL franchise, but the lack of clarity on the definition of
property and the decision not to apply Section 1240.050 in Oakland
Raiders I makes the analysis of the Mebane opinion the appropriate
analytical framework for the extra-territorial location of targeted property
issue raised by the City of Richmond's decision to condemn mortgage
loans.
The Oakland Raiders I and II cases present a problem for the City. The
secondary mortgage market is an interstate industry, touching investors
from all over the country. The secondary mortgage market, particularly the
buying and selling of mortgage-backed securities, is subject to federal
securities and tax law. The Richmond condemnation plan is thus
vulnerable to a challenge based on the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
A second problem for the City of Richmond is raised by the Oakland
Raiders I case because the factors to determine the location of targeted
intangible property do not seem applicable to residential mortgage loans.
The factors of principal place of business, "home games," and the situs of
tangible personal property indicate the necessity of sufficient contacts
within the condemnor's territorial boundaries. By way of analogy to the
so-called totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the City and MRP recast
the court's factors into six,167 five of which primarily focus on residential
lenders' remedies for defaults of residential mortgage loans in actions that
are tied to the collateral real properties in Richmond. This appears to have
165. Harden v. Superior Court, 284 P.2d 9, 17 (Cal. 1955); see supra notes 116 and
120 and accompanying text.
166. Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.Rptr. 2d 562 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992); see supra notes 128 et seq., and accompanying text.
167. Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., supra note 34, at 18-19 (The City
and MRP took the factors from the California Supreme Court's opinion in Oakland
Raiders I, 32 Cal.3d at 74-75 (1982), and recast the factors as follows: "In particular:
(1) the debtor is domiciled in the same location as the security (i.e. the home); (2) the
loans are secured by real property with a physical location, and the security interest
would be condemned with the loan; (3) the security interests are recorded where the
property is located; (4) the creditor's remedies are based on the location of the real
property; (5) the basis for the public purpose for which the loans would be condemned
is assisting residents in the condemnor's jurisdiction; and (6) the information necessary
to value the loans concerns the debtor and the security property, not the creditor").
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been done in order to obviate the territorial limitation problem. The
connection between remedies and land in Richmond is distinguishable from
the California Supreme Court's factors that directly relate to essential
characteristics of ownership in a partnership entity with direct, physical
contacts in the City of Oakland. The place of business, the place of
performing the entertainment, and the place of tangible property were all in
Oakland. As a matter of critical distinction, the key attributes of the
mortgage loan debts are the promissory notes possessed outside of
Richmond, the legal and beneficial ownership of said debts that are outside
of Richmond, and the borrowers' place of performance, i.e., the place of
payment to the lender (or loan servicer or the trustees) at a location most
likely outside of Richmond. The security lien on the land follows the debt,
which is located at the domicile of the creditor, according to authority cited
by the trustees.16 s
Though it is not surprising that the City seeks to pin the factors to land
inside its boundaries, it ignores the fact that loan agreements are more than
remedies. Remedies are but one set of choices made available to lenders in
a much broader set of terms in private contracts in which the parties accept
a division of rights and duties. Loans give lenders substantive contractual
rights, including the right to sue a borrower personally for the intentional
waste of collateral property though he is located elsewhere, or to designate
the borrower's place of performance (i.e., the place of payment), which
could very well be outside of California.1 6 9 Even if these latter types of
lawsuits are few, the City's particular emphasis on remedies actually forces
a restricted view of the loan agreement and thus should not be dispositive
in the determination of the location of the loans.
A sixth factor that the City considers relevant in determining the location
of the loans is the public purpose of helping persons within the
condemnor's territorial jurisdiction. This adds nothing new to the analysis
since the federal and state constitutions require a public use, and state
168. Pls' Motion for Prelim. Inj., supra note 38, at 6-7; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 2936
(West 2015). In their opposition, Richmond and MRP partly rely on cases that
involved the forfeiture of assets under federal law during the extreme circumstances of
war, including a federal law that called for the forfeiture of assets, including credit,
held by Confederate enemies during the Civil War. Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for
Prelim. Inj., supra note 34, at 19. Forfeiture of enemy assets during times of war is too
extraordinary to be an appropriate precedent for the well-established interstate
secondary mortgage market during a time of peace.
169. For instance, a lender may decide to sue a borrower who has moved outside of
Richmond on the promissory note or for intentional waste of the real property, both of
which in certain circumstances can be exceptions to the anti-deficiency protection that
borrowers have under California law. For the intentional waste exception, see
generally Cornelison v. Kombluth, 542 P.2d 981, 990-93 (Cal. 1975); Nippon Credit
Bank v. 1333 North Cal. Blvd., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 421 (Cal. Ct. App, 2001).
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statutes require a taking to be tied to the public entity's purposes. Every
public entity will make statements that its project and related condemnation
of property outside its district will be for the purpose of assisting citizens
who reside within the district; this is the constant refrain of public officials.
A great risk exists that these types of self-serving statements will be readily
accepted as proof that the extra-territorial taking satisfies the public
purpose no matter how tenuous the linkage between the property and the
circumstances that create the necessity for the property to be taken to
achieve the purpose. As it is now, it is very tenuous whether the
circumstances in Richmond create the need to condemn 624 residential
mortgage loans, even if located inside Richmond, in order to accomplish a
public use. If self-serving statements are accepted as a criterion and taken
at face value, then the requirements for the resolution of necessity are made
superfluous.170  Therefore, such self-serving statements should not be a
factor in the determination of the location of the targeted property.
Meanwhile, the more persuasive parallel is that of the government's tax
claims against creditors with assets such as loans because only government
is given the authority to assert the taxing power, and only under limited
circumstances.17 ' Because the power of eminent domain is uniquely given
to government, the power to condemn is more akin to the power to tax than
it is to the attributes of remedies available to private residential mortgage
lenders. 172
Therefore, California courts ought to consider the location of residential
mortgage loans to be the domicile of the lenders, which would require the
local municipality to meet the higher standard of showing that there is a
legal necessity for its extra-territorial taking, as well as satisfy all other
170. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1245.220, 1240.040 (West 2015) ("A public entity
may not commence an eminent domain proceeding until its governing body has
adopted a resolution of necessity that meets the requirements of this article."). For the
requisite information of a resolution of necessity, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1240.030 (West 2015). See supra note 137 and accompanying text. For the type of
presumption created by a resolution of necessity, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
1245.250 (a), (c) (West 2015). See infra notes 174, et seq. and accompanying text.
171. One commentator argues that the appropriate rule for the location of mortgage
loans that are targeted for condemnation is based on government's authority to tax. See
Moskowitz, supra note 24, at 655-56, 665.
172. In an early California Supreme Court case the distinctions between the powers
of taxation and eminent domain were discussed in a dispute where, under the taxing
power, assessments were upheld when imposed on street frontage property owners for
street improvements. The Court stated: "Indeed, taxation itself, in its ordinary sense,
is, perhaps, not the exercise of a distinct, independent sovereign power, but only one
form of exercising the right of eminent domain. Yet the terms, the right of taxation, and
the right of eminent domain are ordinarily used to express different specific ideas,
although both are, doubtless, grounded in the same ultimate sovereign power." Emery
v. S.F. Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345, 360 (1865).
274 Vol, 4:2
CONDEMNING A RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOAN
requirements imposed on governments that wish to take property from
persons to whom they are not accountable.
(i) Resolution ofNecessity and Presumptions
It is through the resolution of necessity that local legislatures declare the
facts that exist in their jurisdiction that they consider to make it legally
necessary to exercise the power of eminent domain against extra-territorial
property. If the legislature is unable, the owner of the property may
challenge the taking, and may be granted a writ of prohibition to stop a trial
court from its attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.1 73 It is
thus appropriate to review the Mebane opinion regarding the resolution of
necessity.
When there is an attempt to condemn extra-territorial property, the local
municipality loses the conclusive presumption it is afforded by the
enactment of a resolution of necessity.1 74  California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1245.250(a) establishes that the factual circumstances
stated in the resolution of necessity are conclusively presumed true when
the targeted property is within the locality's territorial limits. On the other
hand, if the property is outside city limits the locality's resolution of
necessity "merely creates a presumption" under Section 1245.250 (c) that
the facts stated therein are true.' 75 This change in presumption was another
reason, according to the court in Mebane, to require the flood district to
meet the higher standard of legal necessity when it sought to condemn the
targeted extra-territorial property.1 76 The Mebane court adopted prior case
law when it concluded:
Accordingly, we hold that the determination of whether a local public
agency's power of extraterritorial condemnation is "necessarily implied as
an incident of one of its other enumerated powers" involves a
determination of "legal necessity," which has been defined by the courts as
a matter of "urgency of extreme expediency or necessity," or "manifestly
desirable" or "essential to the declared objects" of the entity [citations
omitted], or otherwise indicated by "clear implication" [citation omitted]. 77
The stringent legal necessity standard and the elimination of the
conclusive presumption are appropriate, for they serve as a check against
excessive local government power.
173. Harden v. Superior Court, 284 P.2d 9, 17 (Cal. 1955).
174. Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court., 12 Cal.Rptr. 2d 562, 568-69
(Cal Ct. App. 1992).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 570.
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(ii) Necessity and Considerations ofEconomy
Matters of economic efficiency can bear on whether a condemning
agency is able to establish the legal necessity to condemn extra-territorial
property. A condemning agency may take into account considerations of
economy as it evaluates its project and the need to condemn property.178 In
Sacramento Municipal Utilities Distribution v. Pacific G&E Co., the court
acknowledged with approval a public utility's consideration of economy
for a project where it sought the condemnation of property outside the
district's limits in part because it was more efficient to jointly use another
entity's utility poles.179 That court reasoned:
There is substantial evidence to sustain a determination that retention of
the facilities in that area is necessary or convenient for service to the
inhabitants of the district. While the making of a financial profit alone may
not authorize a taking, as cases cited by appellant indicate, it does not
follow that considerations of economy and the prevention of excessive
expenditures may not be taken into account in determining necessity or
convenience.iso
In contrast, the flood district in Mebane was not concerned with
efficiency when it sought to condemn land outside its district for
environmental mitigation purposes. Nor has the City of Richmond taken
into consideration matters of economic efficiency in its plan to condemn
residential mortgage loans. Instead, Richmond is concerned with
underwater mortgages that purportedly will lead to an increase in defaults,
foreclosures, and blight.' 8 ' Based on the improvement of economic
conditions within the City,1 82 it appears the City's greater motivation would
become profitability if it actually moves forward with its plan. But,
profitability alone cannot justify the taking of residential mortgage loans.
(iii) Necessity and Blight
Blight can justify the taking of property, though there does not appear to
be a statute or a case in California that authorizes the taking of extra-
territorial property for the purpose of eliminating blight. Notwithstanding
the apparent lack of legal authority and the awareness that the residential
mortgage loans are held by trusts located outside city limits, City of
Richmond councilpersons rested the justification of mortgage loan takings
on the threat of blight. In Resolution No. 120-13, they stated:
178. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Pac. G. & E. Co., 165 P.2d 741, 750 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1946).
179. Id. at 750-751.
180. Id. at 750.
181. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 42, 43, and 44 and accompanying text.
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[¶] WHEREAS, home values in Richmond plummeted after the crash
and still have a long way to go to recover, with large numbers of Richmond
homeowners having "underwater loans" or "negative equity"-where the
outstanding principal balance on the home loan exceeds the market value of
the house-which increases the likelihood offurther foreclosures, inhibits
the ability to refinance, and dampens consumer confidence and economic
activity; and
[$1 WHEREAS, in recognition of the severity of this crisis the City of
Richmond ("Richmond") has already begun working to develop the
Richmond CARES (Community Acton to Restore Equity & Stability)
program in order to help address this crisis; Richmond CARES being a
program that seeks to reduce foreclosures and blight by helping more
homeowners get into affordable sustainable mortgages; ... 183
As discussed above, 184 the conditions in Richmond are evidently
improving and the City is not in a crisis. There is, however, a difference of
opinion within the Richmond City Council and the majority that passed the
initial resolution may, in fact, proceed with its plan to condemn mortgage
loans. In that event, the City Council must comply with California law
relevant to the reduction or elimination of blight.
California law typically addresses the elimination of blight through a
local municipality's redevelopment plan.'85 Local regulations that seek to
remove blight are upheld by California courts,'1 6 which look for the
regulation to include a redevelopment plan that will invalidate the
regulation if enacted without sufficient evidence that blight exists in the
183. Res. No. 120-13, Richmond City Council ¶ 3-4 (Cal. 2013), available at
http://www.alicelaw.org/uploads/asset/assetfile/1955/2013_RichmondResolution12
0.pdf, (emphasis added).
184. See supra notes 42, 43, and 44 and accompanying text.
185. In 2012 California law regarding funding for local municipality's
redevelopment agencies changed. In response, the California legislature enacted new
legislation, effective January 1, 2014, that empowered local agencies (defined as cities,
counties, city and county, and housing authorities) to undertake remediation measures
on blighted property (defined as property that is contaminated by the release of
hazardous materials) within a blighted area. Cf CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
25403-25403.8 (West 2014). See generally Michael M. Sandez, Nature Abhors A
Vacuum And So Do Local Governments: But Vacant Property Ordinances Go Too
Far, 10 J.L. EcoN & POL'Y 345, 365-70, n. 114 (2014) (discussing California legal
requirements for the elimination of blight by redevelopment agencies in the context of
a local vacant property ordinance that by legislative flat modified underlying residential
mortgage loans secured by real property within the city so that lenders rather than
borrowers were obligated to maintain and keep secure homes where lenders had
initiated nonjudicial foreclosures because the borrowers had defaulted on their loans
and vacated their homes).
186. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 155 Cal. Rptr.
636, 642-43 (Cal Ct. App. 1979) (holding the City properly exercised its police power
in removing urban blight).
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area of the proposed project.18 7 Such evidence is measured by the statutory
definitions of blight. Blight involves physical and economic conditions' 8
that are so prevalent and substantial that "a serious physical and economic
burden on the community"1 89 is created. If the administrative record is
deficient with regard to substantial evidence of blight, the regulation will
be invalidated.' 90  These requirements ensure that the regulation is
promulgated pursuant to a municipality's "legitimate governmental
function."'91
The City of Richmond faces a stiff challenge should it choose to move
forward with a resolution of necessity. Though it is possible that some of
the residential loans the City wants to condemn are within its boundaries,
the probability is that they are beyond city limits.1 92 As such, the City will
not have a conclusive presumption that the statements in its resolution of
necessity are true, imposing on it the burden of passing a resolution of
necessity with substantial empirical data that indeed confirms that the
underwater mortgages, defaults, and foreclosures result in blight, which
severely impacts the City's economic standing. Recent statements by
Richmond officials say otherwise, however.1 9 3 Given the state of the City,
Richmond officials are unlikely to satisfy the urgency that is required by
the higher standard of legal necessity or prove that blight exists.
b. Policies Protective ofRepresentative Government
As a second element derived from the Mebane case, policy reasons
187. See, e.g., Boelts v. Lake Forest, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 164, 178-79 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (holding the city's assertions were conclusory and failed to meet the definition of
blight; city unsuccessfully argued there was blight because, among other reasons, a
shopping center had antiquated design, 23 commercial vacancies, and signs of
deterioration and deferred maintenance; the court pointed out that the city failed to
show a connection between the project and health and safety problems, structural
defects, or depreciation of property values); Friends of Mammoth v. Mammoth Lakes
Redevelopment Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 359, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(insufficient evidence to support the project even though 29% of buildings affected by
deterioration and dilapidation); L.A. v. Glendora Redevelopment Project, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 104, 116-117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining the criteria that must be found
for there to be a finding of blight).
188. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030(b)(2), § 33031(a) [physical conditions]
and (b) [economic conditions] (West 2011).
189. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (b)(1) (West 2011).
190. Beach-Courchesne v. Diamond Bar, 155 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 268, 274 (Cal.
App. Ct. 2000).
191. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 155 Cal. Rptr.
at 642.
192. Moskowitz, supra note 24, at 665, nn. 217-218.
193. See supra, notes 42, 43, and 44 and accompanying text; Eagle, supra note 49,
at 833.
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further support the "significant limitation [of a mere presumption created
by Section 1245.250(c)] on an entity's exercise of extra territorial
condemnation."l 94 An owner of targeted property that is located outside
the local entity's territorial limits is not a citizen who can, through his vote
hold officials of the condemnor (or the local legislative body) accountable
and is not a local citizen or taxpayer who has the full knowledge to
adequately assess the public use project contemplated by the condemning
agency.' 95 The Mebane court put it this way: "But where the property
sought to be taken is outside and distant from these territorial limits, neither
such knowledge [helpful to the agency officials, citizens, and taxpayers]
nor such accountability [of the legislative body and its functionaries] may
be present."l 9 6 Though it would be a fair assumption that the owners of the
targeted extra-territorial property and their neighbors would prefer
environmentally safe land, the court in Mebane was correctly concerned
with the use of excessive power by local flood district officials who could
take advantage of the affected property owners. Where the eminent
domain law did not supply express or legally necessary implied authority,
the Mebane court did not grant it either.
For the City of Richmond, the risk of minimizing or ignoring the policy
concern regarding political representation exists. It must be kept in mind
that although the trustees in the recent litigation are major banks and
probably have branches within Richmond city limits, the banks filed their
claims in their capacity as trustees and on behalf of trusts located outside of
Richmond. The trusts are made up of investors from all over the country
that include "various labor unions, credit unions, retirement pension funds
and individuals."' 97 To help some people in the City, councilmembers
want to ignore the people who invest in it through labor unions, credit
unions, and retirement pension funds.
Checks and balances, when used within a properly functioning
constitutional republic, are effective antidotes to excessive power. Whether
the municipality's concern relates to foreclosures and blight, or to
194. Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.Rptr. 2d 562, 569 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992).
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing L.A. v. Keck, 14 Cal.App.3d 920, 925, 926 (1971)) ("But where the
property sought to be taken is outside and distant from these territorial limits, neither
such knowledge nor such accountability may be present. Thus, the Legislature has
specifically provided that the courts shall pass upon such a taking [citation omitted].
[W]e hold that neither the resolution of the board of a public utility district or the
ordinance of the legislative body of a city is prima facie evidence of necessity under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1241, subdivision 2, where the property is outside the
condemning agency's territorial limits." [Section 1241 repealed; subd. 2 replaced by
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.030, 1240.040, 1245.210 et seq.]).
197. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
2015 279
AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESS LA wREVIEW
economic revitalization, the condemnation of extra-territorial property
pursuant to an unclear implied power is tantamount to a de facto
disenfranchisement of owners of such extra-territorial property. Officials
who are wont to exercise power, regardless of whether the law permits it or
the data supports it will weaken principles relative to lawful jurisdiction
and constitutional representation. Because trust in government is quite
low, it is detrimental for local government to reach for property that may be
located anywhere in the worldl 98 and whose owners have no voice, no vote,
and no representation.
c. Extension ofImplied Authority to Condemn Extra-Territorial
Property that is Incidental to a Statutory Mandate
The third element requires a showing that a statute that grants a
municipality the express power to take property will also enable an implied
power to condemn extra-territorial property if the extra-territorial taking is
incidental to the statute's mandates. Section 1240.050 provides an
alternative source of authority where "[the power is] necessarily implied as
an incident of one of its other statutory powers." There are few cases that
have held that the implied power to condemn property outside a public
agency's boundaries is valid. The Mebane court noted a case in which a
city that had the express power to construct sewers also had the power to
"extend them beyond its boundaries to an outfall as an implied incident of
its express powers when necessary or manifestly desirable."l 99 Also, it
noted another case that held that where a city was authorized by statute to
condemn water systems inside its boundaries, condemn wells and water on
adjacent lands, and provide water services inside and outside its
boundaries, the city also had the implied [] power [to take a water system
outside its boundaries] as incidental to the existence of the powers
expressly granted.2 00 Land for a sewerage outfall and water systems for the
delivery of water services were within the implied authority of
condemnation because they were incidental to and accompanied the
respective statutory mandates in providing essential infrastructure needs.
In Mebane, the issue became whether the mitigation of environmental
conditions on extra-territorial land was incidental to the flood district's
express regulatory mandate to construct, maintain, or operate all works or
improvements inside or outside the district for the purposes of flood control
and water conservation. The Mebane court was consistent when it
198. Moskowitz, supra note 24, at 656.
199. Kenneth Mebane Ranches, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562 (citing Harden, 44 Cal.2d at
638-39) (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 562-63 (citing City of N. Sacramento v. Citizens Utilities Co., 192
Cal.App.2d 482, 485 (1961)) (emphasis added).
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followed the analogy of the water system condemnation case (i.e., City of
N. Sacramento v. Citizens Utilities Co.) to find the flood district's implied
power to condemn property outside its district on the ground that it would
be incidental to the district's express statutory purposes of flood control
and water conservation. 20 1 The analogic reasoning led to the next question:
whether environmental mitigation was "legally necessary" to achieve the
flood district's statutory purposes. Because the California statutory
environmental scheme only required mitigation when feasible and did not
grant additional powers to local agencies, the Mebane court held that it
could not extend an implied power to condemn the extra-territorial land for
mitigation purposes as incident to the flood district's statutory purposes of
202flood control and 'vater conservation. Consequently, the court issued a
writ of prohibition that ordered the trial court to sustain the demurrer with
leave to amend.20 3
The City of Richmond has neither an express statutory purpose, nor
express constitutional authority, to engage in residential mortgage loan
restructuring. As a consequence, it cannot claim that there is an implied
power to condemn mortgage loans outside its city limits incidental to some
express mandate. Authority to condemn property within its boundaries for
the elimination of blight or economic redevelopment may exist, but such
authority, to the extent it exists, does not imply the power to condemn
intangible property such as mortgage loans outside its city limits.
IV. CHALLENGES FOR THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Notwithstanding the number of favorable articles in support of the plan
to condemn residential mortgages, the City has a number of challenges
ahead of it if and when it decides to implement the plan. This Article
examines the threshold question of the location of the mortgages and the
appropriate legal standard for the condemnation of extra-territorial property
and the resolution of necessity. The underlying policies that appear to
motivate the City are considered as well.
201. Id. at 563.
202. Id. at 564-65. The California statutory environmental scheme is known as the
California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE, §§ 21000 et seq
(West 2015).
203. Kenneth Mebane Ranches, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565-66. The Court granted the
flood district leave to amend its complaint because the district contended that in an
amended complaint it could allege a cause of action for eminent domain because it was
required to conduct environmental mitigation as a condition for approval of its project
by the relevant public agencies. The Mebane Court did not address this flood district's
contention or the adequacy of such an allegation in an amended complaint.
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A. The Threshold Question
The threshold question involves the determination of the location of the
residential mortgage loans. The case law that lays out the more persuasive
reasoning is that which bases the location of intangible property on where
the governmental entity asserts its taxing power against a creditor's assets,
including loans. The domicile of the creditor is the location of the loan.
The power of eminent domain, like the taxing power, is immense and is
given exclusively to the government (or its various agencies). The implied
power to condemn property approximates the enumerated power of the
government to tax its citizens. In contrast, the City seeks the application of
a set of factors that are not analogous to governmental authority but instead
focus on a geographic-centric view of lenders' remedies for defaults of
residential mortgages. If a court in a case of first impression rules that
residential mortgage loans are located in the domicile of the lenders, then
the City must demonstrate that there is a "legal necessity" to condemn
extra-territorial mortgage loans.
B. The Standard ofLegal Necessity
According to the Mebane court, Richmond would be required to meet
the higher standard of a "legal necessity" if it pursues its plan since it seeks
to take property that is located outside city limits. California law prior to
Mebane enunciated a variety of formulations that the Mebane court
described as "legal necessity." A local municipality must show that the
extra-territorial taking is an "urgency of extreme expediency or necessity,"
is "manifestly desirable," is "essential to the declared objects" of the entity,
or is "indicated by clear implication." The facts in Richmond might
indicate the effects of an economic downturn, but it does not necessarily
follow that blight actually exists or that there is a "legal necessity" to take
property located outside its boundaries. Due to the lack of express
statutory authority to take property outside its limits, the City will not be
able to claim that the taking is "indicated by clear implication" let alone an
"urgency of extreme expediency or necessity."
C. Resolution ofNecessity and Presumptions
The Richmond City Council must enact a resolution of necessity. If in
fact a court rules that the mortgage loans are outside of Richmond, the City
Council's resolution of necessity will be given a rebuttable presumption
that the statements therein are true. However, there are evident signs of
economic improvement in Richmond, which undermine its past claim that
there is a serious threat of defaults, foreclosures, and blight. The trustees of
the mortgage-backed securitized trusts would likely be in a position to
rebut the statements in the City's resolution of necessity because the
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underlying circumstances in Richmond do not create a legal necessity.
D. Policy
The California legislature has an implicit, if not an explicit, concern for
owners of property that are located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
condemning agency. This is indicated by the distinction in Section
1240.050 between property inside and outside an agency's boundaries.
Also, the legislature created a difference between conclusive and rebuttable
presumptions given to a resolution of necessity, depending on the location
of the property. The concern rightly focuses on the property owner as a
citizen and taxpayer, and appropriately places limits on the power to
condemn property beyond territorial limits. The policy to protect
representative government requires the condemnor to act only pursuant to
express statutory mandates and to make a greater showing of need before it
can take property from those without a vote or representation. The City
must recognize that its paternalistic desire to provide assistance to those
within its city limits will adversely affect those people who invest in trusts
located outside of its city limits.
There are broader policy implications at work. The U.S. Supreme Court
has spoken of government's longstanding function of promoting economic
development.204 But promoting economic development should not mean
participating in it. Government repeatedly has proven itself to be grossly
inefficient, unsurprisingly incompetent in all but a few tasks such as law
enforcement and military (which themselves are incompetent at times), and
unjustly prone to cronyism. A significant majority of elected, appointed,
and bureaucratic officials take every opportunity to create a bigger, more
paternalistic government, regardless of the cost and debt accumulation. It
is often said by such officials that for those who have much, much is
required,205 as justification to take money and property from those who
have it in order to redistribute to those who do not have it.20 6 Politicians
and others who use this biblical reference completely ignore the biblical
admonitions regarding stewardship, 207 prudence, 20 8 and diligence .209 Those
204. See supra note 14 and accompanying reference to Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954).
205. Luke 12:48 ("Everyone to whom much was given, of him much will be
required, and from him to whom they entrusted much, they will demand the more.").
206. "Man can live and satisfy his wants only by ceaseless labor; by the ceaseless
application of his faculties to natural resources. This process is the origin of property.
But it is also true that a man may live and satisfy his wants by seizing and consuming
the products of the labor of others. This process is the origin of plunder." See
FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW, 10 (Dean Russell, trans., The Found. for Econ. Educ.,
Inc. 1993) (1850)) (emphasis added).
207. Proverbs 27:23-27.
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officials who press for greater government expansion and more
redistribution have yet to understand that reliance on the civil magistrate
for one's sustenance is not a biblical model,21 0 but instead is a paternalism
that is a form of idolatry. 211 They also strive to grow government through
economic means that are contrary to the biblical principle that the debtor is
the servant of the lender.212 Printing money by fiat will not solve the debt
problem; nor will it win the war on poverty, as the past fifty years has
proven. It is no secret that federal, state, and local governments are
overwhelmed by their debt service, which, in turn, imposes greater and
greater burdens on taxpayers. To take a phrase used in another context,
government's promotion of economic development is not an economic
suicide pact, yet that is the road on which we have been put by officials
who make short-sighted decisions based on their job retention or a belief
that governmental paternalism serves the public good. An overwhelming
amount of economic evidence demonstrates that the many forms of wealth
redistribution and subsidy programs concocted by the government are
ruining the country's economic health.
The financial crisis of 2008 had far-reaching effects, and governments-
federal, state, and local-have sought to provide remedies through the
promulgation of more regulation and bureaucracy. What government has
not done is eliminate the governmental policies and programs that helped
create the crisis in the first place.2 13
E. Implied Power Incidental to Statutory Purpose
According to the analysis by the court in Mebane, the City of Richmond
208. Proverbs 22:3 ("The prudent sees danger and hides himself, but the simple go
on and suffer for it."); Proverbs 10:5 ("He who gathers in summer is a prudent son, but
he who sleeps in harvest is a son who brings shame.").
209. Proverbs 21:5 ("The plans of the diligent lead surely to abundance, but
everyone who is hasty comes only to poverty."); Proverbs 10:4 ("A slack hand causes
poverty, but the hand of the diligent makes rich.").
210. Proverbs 27:23-24 ("Be sure you know the condition of your flocks, give
careful attention to your herds; for riches do not endure forever, and a crown is not
secure for all generations.") (italics added); Psalms 118:9 ("It is better to take refuge in
the LORD than to trust in man. It is better to take refuge in the LORD than to trust in
princes."); Psalms 146:3-4 ("Put not your trust in princes, in a son of man, in whom
there is no salvation. When his breath departs, he returns to the earth; on that very day
his plans perish.").
211. HERBERT SCHLOSSBERG, IDOLS FOR DESTRUCTION 177-231 (Crossway Books
1993).
212. Proverbs 22:7b ("[T]he borrower is the slave of the lender.").
213. See GRETCHEN MORGENSON & JOSHUA ROSNER, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT:
How OUTSIZED AMBITION, GREEN, AND CORRUPTION LED To ECONOMIC
ARMAGEDDON (Times Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2011); THOMAS
SOWELL, THE HOUSING BooM AND BUST (Basic Books rev. ed. 2010).
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will need to first show that it has express authority to condemn intangible
property outside its jurisdiction, and if it can do that, it must then show that
it has an implied power to condemn mortgage loans as incidental to the
cited statutory purpose. As of this writing, there does not appear to be any
authority, constitutional or statutory, that enables a local municipality to
condemn intangible property, like residential mortgage loans, for the sake
of the elimination of blight or economic revitalization. Without express
authority, it will not have an implied power to condemn such property.
Thus, the City cannot claim that its plan to condemn residential mortgage
loans is incidental to a statutory mandate.
CONCLUSION
The open legal question as to whether local government can force itself
into the secondary mortgage market through the exercise of its eminent
domain powers to condemn residential mortgage loans must be answered in
the negative. California courts must prohibit local public entities from the
exercise of eminent domain power in this way. Local government does not
have the expertise or the resources to engage in such activity. Reliance on
third parties for the expertise and capital to pay just compensation for the
loans only confirms that the local municipality is beyond its function and
purpose. Moreover, participation in the secondary mortgage market takes
local government away from the core purposes of protecting life and
property.214
An exercise of eminent domain powers to condemn residential mortgage
loans attempts to fix the consequences of a financial problem that was, to a
great extent, created by the government. Assertion of government power in
this fashion when market forces already are at work would be a colossal
error. Condemnation of residential mortgage loans is unprecedented; it
ignores the limits imposed on local municipalities by the constitution,
statutes, and case law; it injects an incompetent actor into the secondary
mortgage market; and it attempts a fix when there is an insufficient need in
the locale. The City of Richmond ought to cease and desist.
214. The argument in favor of the mortgage loan condemnation plan is ironic in that
it basically seeks to take property from some so that others may keep their property.
That those from whom property is taken might be able to afford or recover from the
losses that would occur under the plan does not lessen the reality that property has been
taken from lender A to give (sell) to lender B.
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